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PRESCRIBING PRIVACY: THE UNCERTAIN
ROLE OF THE PHYSICIAN IN THE
PROTECTION OF PATIENT PRIVACY
ROBERT M. GELLMANt
Because medical records are now more comprehensive than ever
before, they increasingly are being demandedfor uses both inside and
outside of the medicial profession. Mr. Gellman contends that existing
ethical and legal guidance is inadequate to aid physicians in dealing
with the confidentiality issues raised when patient information is re-
quested or demandedfrom them, and supports this contention by exam-
ining the dilemmas faced by physicians presented with such requests or
demands. He concludes that ethical andjudicial guidance will continue
to be inadequate, and that the only practical way to develop suitable
guidance is through legislation.
Since the dawn of medical practice, confidentiality has been recognized as
essential to the physician-patient relationship. Until the maintenance of com-
plete medical records became common earlier this century, however, little
written patient information was available. Consequently, physicians were
rarely asked to breach patient confidentiality. Available legal and ethical gui-
dance on confidentiality questions, although limited, was generally sufficient
to permit physicians to respond to requests for patient information in a consis-
tent and suitable manner.
Now that medical records are a more reliable and comprehensive source
of information about patients, requests for the disclosure of identifiable medi-
cal information are made more frequently and by a wider variety of institu-
tions than ever before. As patient information is increasingly sought for
purposes not directly related to medical treatment, conflicts over the use of
medical records become more acute. Because the complexity of the physi-
cian's responsibility has not been fully recognized, however, traditional legal
and ethical confidentiality principles provide little assistance in resolving these
conflicts.
This Article considers the problem largely from the perspective of the
physician who has the primary responsibility for the medical records of his
patients.' Since those seeking access to medical records frequently approach
the record keeper rather than the patient, privacy interests will be protected
t Counsel, Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture, House
Committee on Government Operations. B.A. 1970, University of Pennsylvania. J.D. 1973, Yale
Law School. The author thanks John Fanning, Robert Belair and Charles Marson for their criti-
cisms of earlier drafts. The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the author and do
not represent the views of the House Committee on Government Operations or its Subcommittees.
1. The physician does not always have primary responsibility for his patient's medical
records. In a hospital, for example, significant portions of the hospital records are compiled by
nurses and other nonphysician health professionals. The records are owned by the hospital. See
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only to the extent that the patient's physician is aware of those interests and
has the knowledge, guidance, and ability to take appropriate action.
Part I of this Article describes the major factors that have heightened the
importance of medical confidentiality issues in modem society. Part II consid-
ers existing ethical and legal approaches to confidentiality questions and ar-
gues that these approaches do not adequately guide physicians. Part III
explores some of the dilemmas that physicians may face in deciding how to
respond to requests for disclosure of patient information, and suggests that, in
at least some instances, there are no options consistent with all relevant princi-
ples. The Article concludes that ethical and judicial guidance will continue to
be inadequate, and that the only practical way to develop suitable guidance is
through legislation.
I. GROWING INTEREST IN MEDICAL RECORDS
Although the protection of personal privacy has evolved as a public pol-
icy issue largely in the last hundred years,2 privacy of medical information has
always been recognized as essential to the practice of medicine. The Privacy
IIA HEALTH LAW CENTER, HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL T 3-1 (Attorney's Volume 1973). This may
also be true in a group or corporate practice or in other institutional practice settings.
This Article will not consider the confidentiality problems that can arise in these other set-
tings. While the discussion may be slightly oversimplified, the basic conclusions are not signifi-
cantly distorted. The purpose of medical confidentiality is the protection of the patient and
physician-patient relationship. See infra text accompanying note 4. Regardless of the institu-
tional setting, however, the need for confidentiality in the physician-patient relationship continues
to exist, and the patient's interest in protecting the confidentiality of information is identical. By
concentrating on confidentiality issues in the simplest setting, the nature of the problems can be
more clearly described.
Considerable additional complexities may arise in an institutional setting. The presence of an
institutional care provider means that there is another party, besides the patient and the physician,
with a set of potentially different interests. In a particular circumstance, a hospital might be will-
ing to disclose information even though the physician and the patient do not approve. For exam-
ple, a disclosure might be necessary to fulfill a contractual obligation of the hospital unrelated to
the treatment of the patient. In another instance, a hospital might be willing to disclose patient
information to assist research that neither the patient nor physician supports. A situation may be
complicated by the possibility that the institutional care providers' ethical obligations and the
ethical obligations of medical care providers other than physicians may be different than the obli-
gations of physicians. For example, only physicians subscribe to the Hippocratic Oath. See infra
text accompanying notes 51 & 52.
The additional problems that can arise when a third party is involved in record keeping have
not been fully explored. Some who have considered the need for legislation, however, have sug-
gested that it may be appropriate to apply different standards to institutions than to private practi-
tioners. See H.R. REP. No. 832 pt. I, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1980) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE
PEPORT]; PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION
SOCIETY 292-93 (1977) [hereinafter cited as PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT].
2. The usual starting point for a discussion of personal privacy is Warren & Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890). Prosser mentioned the Warren and Brandeis article
in his discussion of the right of privacy, noting that "[t]he recognition and development of the so-
called 'right of privacy,' is perhaps the outstanding illustration of the influence of legal periodicals
upon the courts." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 802 (4th ed. 1971).
Interest in privacy has grown dramatically in recent years, along with the ability of society to
store, disseminate, and use personal data. This interest is evidenced by a sizeable number of
reports and laws on the subject. Recent reports include: PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 1; COMMISSION ON FEDERAL PAPERWORK, CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVACY (1977); UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COM-
MITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF
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Protection Study Commission noted that physicians have recognized the duty
to keep information confidential "since time immemorial."' 3 In testimony
before a congressional committee, a representative of the American Medical
Association set out the basic case for medical confidentiality:
First, much of the information related by patients to their physicians
is highly personal. Patients have every right to expect that the inti-
mate, personal information communicated to physicians will remain
private. Second, the assurance of confidentiality encourages patients
to be candid with their physicians, and candor is essential to effective
diagnosis and medical management of the patient's ailments.4
The protection of confidential medical information is a more important
concern now than it has been in the past.5 Of the factors that have contributed
to the increased importance of confidentiality, some are internal to the medical
treatment process (for example, modem medical record keeping practices);
6
some are the result of changes in the payment system (for example, third party
payment plans);7 and some are external to the practice of medicine (e.g., in-
creased use of medical information outside of the treatment and payment
process).
8
A. Medical Record Keeping Practices
The amount of medical information about patients that is routinely re-
corded has increased tremendously in recent decades. In a 1977 report on
privacy, the Privacy Protection Study Commission described the record keep-
ing practices of physicians at the beginning of the twentieth century:
CITIZENS (1973); A. WESTIN, COMPUTERS, HEALTH RECORDS, AND CITIZEN RIGHTS (National
Bureau of Standards, Monograph No. 157, 1976).
Recent federal laws include the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976); Right to Finan-
cial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (Supp. V 1981); Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1974); Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa (Supp.
V 1981). For state privacy laws, see R. SMITH, COMPILATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY
LAWS (1981). For a compilation of state laws on health records confidentiality, see NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON CONFIDENTIALITY OF HEALTH RECORDS, HEALTH RECORDS CONFIDENTIALITY
LAW IN THE STATES (1979).
3. PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 283.
4. Privacy of MedicalRecords: Hearings onH. 2979 andH. 3444 Before the Government
Information and Individual Rights Subcomnr of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1129 (1979) (statement of James H. Sammons, M.D., Executive Vice President,
American Medical Association) [hereinafter cited as House Medical Privacy Hearings].
5. A national opinion research survey of attitudes toward privacy conducted in December,
1978, found that 64% of Americans were somewhat or very concerned about threats to personal
privacy. This was an increase of 17 percentage points in eleven months. See Louis HARRIS &
ASSOCIATES, INC. & A. WESTIN, THE DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, reprinted in Public Reaction to
Privacy Issues: Hearing Before the Government Information and Individual Rights Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-109 (1979).
The specific findings on questions relating to medical confidentiality, however, were less de-
finitive. When asked if hospitals and doctors should be doing more to keep personal information
confidential, 23% of the public surveyed said that hospitals should be doing more and 17% said
that doctors should be doing more. Id. at 62. Sixty-five percent, however, thought that it was
important that Congress pass privacy legislation in the area of medicine and health. Id at 102.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 9-14.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 15-26.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 27-41.
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Earlier in this century, when most medical professionals were
family physicians in solo practice, the typical medical record was
simply a small ledger card with entries showing the dates of the pa-
tient's visits, the medications prescribed, and the charges. The physi-
cian was usually able to file the intimate details of a patient's medical
or emotional condition in the "safe crevices of his mind." 9
During this same period, hospital records also contained limited patient infor-
mation. A 1918 survey of record keeping practices of hospitals found that less
than two percent met a minimum requirement that accurate and complete case
records be written for all patients and filed in an accessible manner.10
In contrast to the medical record of the past, the modem hospital record is
a warehouse of information. The American Medical Records Association de-
scribes the contents of a typical hospital medical record today:
A typical hospital medical record includes the patient's name,
address, age, next of kin, names of parents, date and place of birth,
marital status, religion, military service, social security or medicare
number, source of reimbursement coverage (insurance or govern-
mental), and the identification number assigned by the hospital.
The medical history includes the chief complaint, details of pres-
ent illness, past medical, social and family histories, previous treat-
ment, an inventory of history related to each body system,
medications taken in the past and at present, use of alcohol and to-
bacco, prenatal history if an obstetrical patient, and the provisional
diagnosis.
The physical examination record contains positive and negative
findings of a comprehensive current physical assessment and a pre-
liminary diagnosis.
The record contains, by date and identification of the recorder,
all findings of diagnostic tests administered, consultations sought and
rendered, all orders for medications and treatments, all treatments
provided, drugs administered, findings, observations, progress, reac-
tions or incidents. Finally, there is a comprehensive summary writ-
ten at the time of discharge."
It is apparent from this description that a hospital record may contain
considerable amounts of nonmedical data, including information about a pa-
tient's relatives, financial status, education, employment history, life style, and
any other aspect of a patient's life that is deemed to be relevant to treatment or
research. The Executive Director of the American Medical Records Associa-
tion told the Privacy Protection Study Commission that "a complete medical
record [today] may contain more intimate details about an individual than
could be found in any single document."' 2
The growth of psychiatry as a medical specialty has further contributed to
9. PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 282.
10. E.K. HUFFMAN, MEDICAL RECORD MANAGEMENT 22 (7th ed. 1981).
11. House Medical Privacy Hearings, supra note 4, at 282.
12. PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 282.
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the increase in the type and volume of information in medical records. Psychi-
attic treatment requires a patient to disclose his most intimate and private
thoughts to the physician, including "information concerning the patient's re-
lationships to everything and everybody in the outside world."' 3 As a result,
psychiatric records contain even more comprehensive personal information
than records of other types of medical treatment. Also, the sensitivity of the
information in psychiatric records may be greater. In many cases, that an in-
dividual is consulting a psychiatrist is considered to be the most sensitive in-
formation of all.
14
B. Payment System Changes
The health care payment system has undergone extensive changes in the
past fifty years, and one result is an increase in the amount of medical infor-
mation that is recorded and transferred. The chief cause of this increase has
been the growth of third party payment plans. 15 When bills were presented by
the physician to the patient and paid by the patient, little medical information
was necessary to support the bill. Unlike the patient paying his own bill, how-
ever, the third party payor has no independent knowledge of the nature of the
services provided. Thus, when a third party is paying the bill, information
must be provided by the physician to the third party in order to describe and
support the charges.
Along with this shift in funding sources came an increase in the amount
of health care purchased. 16 As more health care services are provided to con-
sumers, more information is recorded in connection with the provision of
those services. Much of this information is disclosed to third party payors. In
13. Legislation To Protect The Privacy Of Medical Records: Hearings before the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 309-10 (1979) (statement of Marcia Kraft
Goin, M.D., Chairperson, Committee on Confidentiality, American Psychiatric Association)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Medical Privacy Hearings].
14. The New York Times recently reported that thousands of people with mental health
insurance coverage may be paying for psychotherapy out of their own pockets rather than apply-
ing for insurance provided by their employers. "Dr. Steven S. Sharfstein, associate director for
behavioral medicine at the National Institute of Mental Health, guesses that some 15 percent of all
adults who have such insurance and are currently in therapy-or about 150,000 people-waive
reimbursement in favor of confidentiality. He made no estimate of the number of insured em-
ployees who cannot afford to pay for psychiatric care and who forgo treatment rather that let their
employers know they are using their mental health benefits." Thousands with Mental Health Insur-
ance Choose to Pay Own Bill, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1981, at CI, col. 1. See also House Medical
Privacy Hearings, supra note 4, at 357-59 (statement of Jerome S. Beigler, M.D., chairperson,
Committee on Confidentiality, American Psychiatric Association).
15. Accelerated growth of third party payments for health care began at the end of World
War II. Before the war, such payments, except by philanthropic organizations, were not signifi-
cant. Gibson & Waldo, National Health Expenditures, 1980, 3 HEALTH CARE FIN. REv., Sept.
1981, at 1, 11. In 1950, private insurance paid 9% of total national expenditures for personal health
care. Gibson & Waldo, National Health Expenditures, 1981, 4 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Sept.
1982, at 1, 23. By 1981, the share of health expenditures covered by private insurance had grown
to 26.2%. Id at 11.
16. National health expenditures in 1950 were $12.7 billion, or 4.4% of the gross national
product. Gibson & Waldo, NationalHealth Expenditures, 1981, 4 HEALTH CARE FIN. REv., Sept.
1982, at 1, 20. By 1981 total expenditures amounted to $286 billion, or 9.8% of the gross national
product. Id at 19. Per capita spending on personal health care increased from $70 to $1090 be-
tween 1950 and 1981. Id at 23.
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fact, the most frequent disclosure of medical record information is to third
party payors. 17
Third party payors require an extensive amount of information to support
payment of a claim. According to the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association,
the information disclosed, "must be sufficient to establish that services billed
were included under the benefit agreements, necessary and warranted, and
actually delivered. Information needed includes identity of the patient, the
physician, and the facility, diagnosis, treatment description, length of stay, and
billed charges."' 8 In addition, when Blue Cross serves as an intermediary for
government programs, other items of personal information may be necessary
to satisfy the program requirements. 19
A representative of the American Medical Records Association testified
before a congressional committee that the amount of information demanded
by third party payors is increasing:
The demands of third party payors were, in the past, reasonably lim-
ited. Increasingly during the past several years, demands for more
extensive documentation in connection with claims processing have
expanded to include copies of discharge summaries or, more and
more frequently especially for medicare or medicaid reimbursement,
photocopies of the entire record 
20
Thus, the third party payment system requires physicians to disclose signifi-
cant amounts of recorded medical information.
Increased government spending for health care has further increased the
required number of disclosures. With the implementation of Medicare and
Medicaid in 1966, the share of the nation's health bill paid by government
increased significantly.21 A major consequence of increased government
spending for health care is the growth of government programs to control the
cost and improve the delivery and quality of health care. These programs,
which include routine audits,22 medical peer review,23 and fraud, abuse, and
17. House Medical Privacy Hearings, supra note 4, at 350 (statement of Jane Rogers, Director
of Legislative Affairs and Communications, American Medical Records Association).
18. Id at 565 (statement of Marshall R. Crawford, Senior Director, Legislative Director,
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association).
19. Id at 566.
20. Id. at 350 (statement of Jane Rogers, Director of Legislative Affairs and Communica-
tions, American Medical Record Association) (emphasis in original).
21. Gibson & Waldo, NationalHealth Expenditures, 1981, 4 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Sept.
1982, at 1, 22.
22. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13951(e) (1976) (prohibiting payments to Medicare providers unless
information necessary to determine amounts due has been provided); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(42)
(Supp. V 1981) (a state Medicaid plan must provide that the records of a participating entity
providing services on a cost-reimbursable basis will be audited by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c (1976) (establishing Professional Standards Review Organiza-
tions); Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 141-50, 96 Stat.
381-95 (1982) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320, 1395, 1396) (replacing Professional Standards Review
Organizations with "utilization and quality control peer review organizations").
The concern of the medical establishment for the protection of patient records pales in com-
parison to the concern over the protection of peer review activities. The American Medical Asso-
ciation model state law would permit numerous nonconsensual disclosures of patient information,
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waste investigations, 24 frequently require access to identifiable patient infor-
mation to carry out their functions.25 Thus, in addition to disclosures neces-
sary to justify payment of claims, government involvement in health care may
require additional levels of disclosure to support oversight and control mecha-
nisms.26 One consequence is that both physicians and patients have become
used to the routine disclosure of medical information that was previously dis-
closed, if at all, only on rare occasions.
C. Medical Information as a Valuable Resource
The medical record is viewed as a rich repository of information by third
parties. While the early physician's sketchy ledger card was of little general
interest, a modem medical record can be used in many different ways outside
the treatment process. The growing awareness of medical records as a source
of information is one reason why disclosure of the record is increasingly
demanded.
The value of medical information for uses outside the medical treatment
and payment system has not been popularly recognized, and even medical
professionals are largely unaware of the many uses to which the information
may be put. Medical information increasingly is used to make nonmedical
decisions about individuals as well as for purposes unrelated to the individuals
who are the subject of the records.27
The large number of medical data users illustrates the general value of
medical information. The American Medical Records Association has identi-
fied twelve broad categories of "social users" and twenty-four ways medical
information is used outside the medical treatment and payment process. Most
of these uses require access to data that identifies the patient. These users and
uses are as follows:
1. Public Health Agencies
1. in surveillance of diseases of epidemiologic significance
through statistical analysis of information abstracted from med-
ical records
but the proceedings and minutes of medical peer review committees would be protected absolutely
from discovery or from introduction into evidence. See CONFIDENTIALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN-
FORMATION ACT § 7(c), reprinted in House Medical Privacy Hearings, supra note 4, at 1141.
24. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3525 (1976) (granting the Inspector General of the Department of
Health and Human Services subpeona power to be used to prevent fraud and abuse in Depart-
ment programs). See also text accompanying notes 145-46.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 143-65.
26. See generally House REPORT, supra note 1, at 54-58.
27. An increase in the use of medical information for nonmedical purposes has also magni-
fied the consequences of disclosure. In a 1976 work on health records and confidentiality, Profes-
sor Alan Westm described some of the ways that medical information is used to make important,
nonmedical decisions: "[Tihe outward flow of medical data.., has enormous impact on people's
lives. It affects decisions on whether they are hired or fired; whether they can secure business
licenses and life insurance; whether they are permitted to drive cars; whether thay are placed
under police surveillance or labelled a security risk; or even whether they get nominated for and
elected to political office." A. WESTIN, supra note 2, at 60.
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2. Medical and Social Researchers, institutional and
extrainstitutional
1. for investigations of disease patterns, effects of disease on
functions of daily living, including occupational health and
safety
3. Rehabilitation and Social Welfare Programs
1. in determination of need for specific types of rehabilitation
programs through analysis of incidence data
2. in development of individual rehabilitation and training
plans for participants in programs for the handicapped, re-
tarded and drug and alcohol abusers
4. Employers
1. for administration of employer-provided health insurance
plans
2. for determination of employment suitability
3. in treatment of job related injuries and correction of occu-
pational hazards
4. to determine disability
5. Insurance Companies
1. in determination of risks in writing insurance
2. in determination of liability for claims
6. Government Agencies: federal, state and local
1. for allocation of government resources for schools, health
care facilities, education institutions, etc. based on vital statistics
submitted from medical records
7. Education Institutions
1. for assessment of suitability for admission to selected edu-
cation programs
2. for maintenance of student and employee health programs
8. Judicial Process
1. in adjudication of civil and criminal matters through use of
the medical record as evidence through the legal process
2. in judicial process for involuntary admission of mentally ill
9. Law Enforcement and Investigation
1. in criminal investigation
2. for security clearance programs
10. Credit Investigation Agencies
1. for determination of credit eligibility
11. Accrediting, Licensing and Certifying Agencies
1. for demonstration of individual fulfillment of criteria for
professional licensing by a state government agency
2. to ascertain competence of practitioners
3. for determination of compliance with critieria for hospital
based education programs
4. as documentation of compliance with standards for institu-
tional accreditation
12. Media: Press, Radio, TV
[Vol. 62
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1. for announcements of developments in medical research
2. for reporting of health hazards, diseases affecting the public
health and newsworthy events.
28
This list requires some explanation and comment. First, the list only in-
cludes those identified by the American Medical Records Association as "so-
cial users." Health care providers and payors for services appear on a separate
list containing nine uses for providers and four for payors.2 9
Second, the list is not complete either with respect to social users or their
uses. For example, the need for access to patient-identifiable medical records
is claimed by the Secret Service and by agencies involved in foreign intelli-
gence activities. 30 The list of uses is also not complete for the identified users.
One example of an omitted use by the media is for reporting health informa-
tion on newsworthy individuals.3 1 Notwithstanding the omissions, the list is
reasonably representative of disclosures that are routinely or occasionally
made and compares favorably in this respect with compilations made by the
Privacy Protection Study Commission and congressional committees that con-
sidered privacy legislation.
32
Third, the American Medical Records Association notes that not all of
the uses are necessarily proper.33 In some instances a particular disclosure of
information for a particular purpose may violate prevailing law or medical
ethics. A disclosure of health information to an employer without the consent
28. AMERICAN MEDICAL RECORD ASSOCIATION, CONFIDENTIALITY OF PATIENT HEALTH IN-
FORMATION: A POSITION STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL RECORD ASSOCIATION 5-6
(1977), reprinted in House Medical Privacy Hearings, supra note 4, at 326-27.
29. Id at 4, reprinted in House Medical Privacy Hearings, supra note 4, at 325.
30. In considering medical privacy legislation during the 96th Congress, committees of the
House and Senate included provisions permitting disclosure of medical information to the Secret
Service and to agencies engaged in foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities. For the
Senate version, see S. 503, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. RaP. No. 96-935, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
22-23 (1980) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. For the House version, see H.R. 5935, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 63-65; H.R. REP. No. 832 pt. 2, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1980).
The Senate never took up S. 503. The House, however, in a post-election session, did con-
sider and reject H.R. 5935. The opposition of the Chairman of the House Select Committee on
Intelligence, who stated his view that the bill would encourage refusals to provide mental health
information to government agencies "when there is a clear national interest in requesting it," was
a factor in the defeat. See 126 CONG. REC. HI 1,370 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980) (statement of Rep.
Boland).
The Watergate scandal brought the acquisition of medical records for "national security"
investigations to the public's attention. During an investigation of Daniel Ellsberg, after the pub-
lication of the Pentagon Papers in 1971, the FBI approached Ellsberg's psychiatrist, but the psy-
chiatrist refused to acknowledge that Ellsberg was a patient. Under the direction of Howard Hunt
and Gordon Liddy, with the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency, the psychiatrist's office
was later broken into in 1973. The federal district court judge cited the burglary of the psychia-
trist's office to explain dismissing criminal charges against Ellsberg relating to the Pentagon Pa-
pers. For a complete account of these events, see P. SCHRAG, TEST OF LOYALTY 109-15, 352-56
(1974).
3 1. See, e.g., Medical Reports Supplied by This Year's Presidential Candidates, 17 MEDICAL
WORLD NEWS 57 (1976).
32. See supra note 30.
33. AMERICAN MEDICAL RECORDS ASSOCIATION, CONFIDENTIALITY OF PATIENT HEALTH
INFORMATION: A POSITION STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL RECORD ASSOCIATION 6
(1977), reprinted in House Medical Privacy Hearings, supra note 4, at 327.
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of the patient is an example of a disclosure that is improper under most cir-
cumstances. The basic list does not distinguish between consensual and non-
consensual disclosures.
Fourth, not all medical records are needed for each use, and some of the
uses account for many more disclosures than others. For example, disclosures
to credit agencies for determination of credit eligibility may be rare, but dis-
closures pursuant to judicial process, for use in civil and criminal trials, are
more routine.
The length of this list of social users of medical information is more strik-
ing than any particular entry. The list demonstrates that supposedly confiden-
tial medical information has a large number of users outside of the treatment
and payment process. Medical information is a valuable resource to many
elements of society, and many users could not operate in the same fashion
without the data.
No attempt is made here to evaluate the legitimacy of the needs of the
social users. Many users can make strong arguments in favor of the social
utility of their activities. This is why Professor Alan Westin concluded that
these secondary uses of medical information raise "the sharpest clash between
society's interest in protecting medical confidentiality and its interest in a wide
variety of other functions."
'34
Another, perhaps more perverse, measure of the value of medical infor-
mation comes from evidence that there is considerable surreptitious trafficking
in medical information. While no broad study of the illicit acquisition of med-
ical information has ever been conducted in this country, a grand jury investi-
gation in Denver, Colorado, and an exhaustive investigation conducted in
Ontario, Canada, support the conclusion that medical information is regularly
obtained for some purposes by improper means. The evidence was sufficient
to permit a congressional committee that considered medical privacy legisla-
tion to conclude that surreptitious trafficking in medical records is "common"
and "nationwide."
35
In Denver, a grand jury found that for over twenty-five years a private
investigative reporting company engaged in a nationwide business of ob-
taining medical information without the patient's consent. 36 In June 1976 the
34. A. WEsTIN, supra note 2, at 85.
35. House REPORT, supra note 1, at 25.
36. Dale Tooley, the District Attorney who led the investigation, told a Senate committee
how the company operated:
There was an instruction book the company had whereby it trained its investigators
to pose as doctors on the telephone. File cards were maintained on hospitals in virtually
every State in the country, on military hospitals and doctors' offices. I can recall one
note in a card file on a Chicago hospital which said: Call after midnight, talk with a
black accent and you can get whatever records you need. It was that precise in detail.
Sometimes sources were paid: Interns, nurses who worked in these hospitals. Occa-
sionally mail was used under false pretenses. But the telephone was the main method.
As this testimony points out, the firm was 99 percent successful in being able to pierce
the medical records protection system of these health care providers.
We located literally hundreds of copies of broad based solicitations sent out to in-
surance companies which said, "We can secure medical records without authorization
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Denver grand jury issued a special report to the Privacy Protection Study
Commission that said in part: "From the evidence, it is clear that the problem
with respect to the privacy of medical records in this jurisdiction exists in
many cities and jurisdictions across the nation."
37
Corroborating evidence for this conclusion can be found in the three vol-
ume report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Confidentiality of
Health Information in Ontario, Canada.38 After an investigation that in-
cluded testimony from over 500 witnesses, the Royal Commission found that
the same conduct uncovered by the Denver grand jury was routine in Ontario
during 1976 and 1977. As with the Denver firm, those seeking the information
were mainly insurance companies and lawyers.39 The Royal Commission was
even able to elicit a general admission from the Insurance Bureau of Canada
that its members had gathered medical information through sources without
the authorization of the patients.4°
Mr. Justice Horace Krever, the Commissioner of the Royal Commission,
testified before a House subcommittee that he suspected that the practices un-
covered during the inquiry occurred not only in Ontario, but throughout all of
North America. Some of the insurance companies and investigative agencies
exposed during the investigation were subsidiaries of American companies.
41
Despite uncertainty about the exact scope of medical information traffick-
ing in America, the existence of a company, and perhaps even an industry,
that obtains such information surreptitiously suggests that there is a significant
demand for the data that goes well beyond the needs of identified "social
users."
Physicians and patients have always recognized the patient's interest in
preventing information from being disclosed to friends or neighbors. There
now exists a large class of additional persons who may have a desire to obtain
that same information. Thus, not only is there more personal information
maintained in medical records, but there are more persons from whom the
information may need to be protected. The value of medical information for
from the patient." Yet, to our knowledge, not a single insurance company or lawyer
reported any of those solicitations to any law enforcement agency, nor to any regulatory
agency.
Senate Medical Privacy Hearings, supra note 13, at 197 (statement of Dale Tooley, District Atty.,
Denver, Colo.). See also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 25; PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 1, at 174, 285-86, 336-37.
37. PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 285.
38. H. KREVER, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE CONFIDENTIAL-
iTy OF HEALTH INFORMATION (Toronto, Ontario, Canada) (1980).
39. Id. at 514-31. See also House Medical Privacy Hearings, supra note 4, at 510-11, 537-40
(statement of Mr. Justice Horace Krever, Commissioner, Royal Commission of Inquiry into the
Confidentiality of Health Records, Toronto, Ontario).
40. H. KREvER, supra note 38,passim; House Medical Privacy Hearings, supra note 4, at 509-
10 (statement of Harvey Strosberg, counsel, Royal Commission on Inquiry into the Confidential-ity of Health Records, Toronto, Ontario). See Senate Medical Privacy Hearings, supra note 13, at
132 (statement of Dale Tooley, District Atty., Denver, Colo.).
41. House Medical Privacy Hearings, supra note 4, at 508 (statement of Mr. Justice Horace
Krever, Commissioner, Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Confidentiality of Health Records,
Toronto, Ontario).
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so many different uses, both licit and illicit, is a major reason why confidential-
ity is, and should be, an issue of greater concern today than ever before.
II. ETHICAL AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDANCE
For guidance in resolving questions about the propriety of disclosing pa-
tient information, physicians can look to the ethical principles that guide the
medical profession or to state or federal law. Three basic criteria can be ap-
plied in evaluating the adequacy of these principles or laws. The first meas-
ures the policy judgments reflected therein. Is the resolution of conflicts
between confidentiality and other important social goals fair? Will the possi-
bility of disclosure of patient information unduly disrupt the physician-patient
relationship? Will the inability of third parties to obtain patient information
interfere with important social functions such as medical research, law en-
forcement, or fiscal control? While these questions are ultimately crucial and
far more complex, the gaps in current confidentiality guidance make them sec-
ondary at this time.
A second criterion is clarity: will the rules be understood by the physi-
cians who will have to apply them? It would not be difficult to develop a
complex set of confidentiality rules and procedures that would, as a result of
their complexity, probably be ignored, misunderstood, or misapplied by physi-
cians. Although confidentiality issues have developed strong legal overtones,
it is crucial to recognize that basic decisions about disclosure are made by
physicians. Thus, rules should be understandable without undue need to rely
on lawyers or the courts for interpretation. 42 Legal principles that can only be
divined through the distillation ofjudicial decisions are of little value. As with
the first criterion, the clarity of confidentiality guidance is secondary at this
time.
A third criterion for evaluating confidentiality principles is comprehen-
siveness: can a physician find an answer to any disclosure question with which
he is faced? Comprehensive confidentiality rules are not difficult to devise.
For example, a rule that prohibits all disclosures is comprehensive. Of course,
the results achieved by such a rule may be undesirable or inconsistent with
law. A more realistic example of comprehensive rules might provide that
some disclosures are mandatory, that others are discretionary under specified
standards or procedures, and that some disclosures are prohibited. All that is
required to make the rules comprehensive is that all possible disclosures fall
into one category or the other.
The review of relevant law and ethics that follows demonstrates that the
available confidentiality guidance generally fails to satisfy the comprehensive-
ness test. With only a few exceptions, 43 existing guidance does not meaning-
fully address all disclosure questions that can arise in the modern practice of
42. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
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medicine. As a result, physicians generally are left to resolve complex confi-
dentiality problems on their own.
A. Ethical Guidance
Since the fourth century B.C., the Hippocratic Oath has called on physi-
cians to maintain the confidentiality of patient communications.44 The clause
of the Oath concerning confidentiality provides: "And whatsoever I shall see
or hear in the course of my profession, as well as outside my profession in my
intercourse with men, if it be what should not be published abroad, I will
never divulge, holding such things to be holy secret."'45 The Hippocratic Oath
does not forbid all disclosures of medical information, but requires only that
physicians keep in confidence that "which should not be published abroad."
Thus, even at its origins, medical confidentiality was not an absolute principle.
The Oath does not define under what circunstances physicians may reveal in-
formation. Whether it was generally understood in ancient Greece what
should or should not be "published abroad," or whether it was intended that
each physician should make the determination on his own is not apparent
from the Oath. In any event, the Hippocratic Oath, although still in use today,
provides no clear guidance for modem physicians faced with disclosure
decisions.
Later ethical codes have different formulations of the confidentiality obli-
gation for physicians. Thomas Percival published an influential46 code of
medical ethics in 1803 that included the following: "Secrecy and delicacy,
when required by peculiar circumstances, should be strictly observed. And the
familiar and confidential intercourse, to which the faculty are admitted in their
professional visits, should be used with discretion and with the most scrupu-
lous regard to fidelity and honour."47 Percival's formulation of the confidenti-
ality obligation appears to be less strict than that of the Hippocratic Oath.
Secrecy was to be strictly observed only when required by "peculiar circum-
stances." Other information obtained in the course of professional visits,
whether or not confidential, was to be used with discretion and with regard to
fidelity and honor. This seems to be a more limited view of the importance of
confidentiality than the "holy secrets" approach of the Hippocratic Oath.
The first Code of Ethics of the American Medical Association, adopted in
44. Medical confidentiality originated prior to the Oath, since the Oath "merely acknowl-
edged a principle already rooted in the ethos of ancient Greece." PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 1, at 283.
45. 1 HIPPOCRATES 164-65 (W. Jones trans. 1923), reprinted in ETHICS IN MEDICINE 5 (S.
Reiser, A. Dyck & W. Curran eds. 1977).
46. A brief history of medical ethics by the AMA's Judicial Council described Percival's code
as "the most significant contribution to ethical history subsequent to Hippocrates." AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION vii (1981).
47. T. PERCIVAL, MEDICAL ETHICS (1803), reprinted in PERCIVAL'S MEDICAL ETHICS 61, 90
(1975).
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1847, was based on Percival's Code.48 The Code's provisions on confidential-
ity repeated the language from Percival's Code without substantive change,
and continued:
The obligation of secrecy extends beyond the period of professional
services; -none of the privacies of personal and domestic life, no
infirmity of disposition or flaw of character observed during profes-
sional attendance, should ever be divulged by [the physician] except
when he is imperatively required to do so. The force and necessity of
this obligation are indeed so great, that professional men have, under
certain circumstances, been protected in their observance of secrecy
by courts of justice.
49
The AMA's addition to Percival's ethics seems to be a strong affirmation
of the importance of confidentiality. The physician could only breach his obli-
gation of secrecy when "imperatively required to do so." Although this ap-
pears to be at least as strong as the Hippocratic Oath, the 1847 Code still failed
to provide any specific guidance to the types of disclosure that qualified as
"imperative."
In 1903 the AMA replaced its Code of Ethics with "Principles of Medical
Ethics." 50 The language on secrecy that appeared in the Code was retained
with some small changes. For example, the 1903 Principles continued to pro-
vide that "secrecy and delicacy should be strictly observed," but no longer
limited this required observance to the "peculiar circumstances" of the
Code.51 The 1903 Principles also clarified when the secrecy obligation may be
breached. Exceptions were to be made only when "imperatively required by
the laws of the state."
52
These principles provided physicians, apparently for the first time, with a
cear, specific, and comprehensive statement of when confidentiality must be
sacrificed to a higher duty. If a proposed disclosure was not required by law,
then the disclosure would be an unethical breach of patient confidentiality.
The 1903 Principles were comprehensive, but a price was paid for the
comprehensiveness. A directive to rely on state law for disclosure authoriza-
tions is inflexible, and this was even more true at the turn of the century than it
is today. Only some of the most modem state laws address complex disclosure
questions, such as those that arise in emergency situations or at other times
when it is not possible to obtain the consent of the patient.5 3 It also follows
that under the 1903 Principles disclosures for public health or medical re-
search were prohibited unless a state law made the disclosure mandatory.
48. CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIA-
TION, supra note 46, at vii.
49. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE OF ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL As-
SOCIATION 1-1-2 (1847), reprinted in PERCIVAL'S MEDICAL ETHICS 218, 220 (1975).
50. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (1903), reprinted in PERCIVAL'S MEDICAL ETHICS 240, 241 (1975).
51. Id at 1-1-2, reprinted in PERCIVAL'S MEDICAL ETHICS at 241.
52. Id. at 1-1-3, reprinted in PERCIVAL'S MEDICAL ETHICS at 241-42.
53. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-4(b) (Supp. 1982).
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Whether the AMA actually intended that disclosures to public health authori-
ties be limited to those affirmatively required by law is problematical.
The certainty of the 1903 Principles may have been helpful, at least in
theory, to the physician confronting a disclosure question. Because the use of
medical information outside the treatment process was more uncommon at the
turn of the century, the guidance might have been more adequate in its day
than it now appears. Changes made in 1912, however, suggest that the inflexi-
bility of the guidance was recognized shortly after the 1903 revisions.
The 1912 AMA Principles retained the "imperatively required by the laws
of the state" exception. Included, however, were the following:
There are occasions, however, when a physician must determine
whether or not his duty to society requires him to take definite action
to protect a healthy individual from becoming infected because the
physician has knowledge, obtained through the confidences entrusted
to him as a physician, of a communicable disease to which the
healthy individual is about to be exposed. In such a case, the physi-
cian should act as he would desire another to act toward one of his
own family under the circumstances. Before he determines his
course, the physician should know the civil law of his commonwealth
concerning privileged communications.
5 4
The introduction of a communicable disease disclosure exception was ac-
companied by a new concept of a general duty to society that is of a higher
order than the duty to protect a patient's privacy. While this approach is more
flexible than the state law exception, it is also more vague and more subjective;
the exception is specifically cast in terms of how the physician would desire
another to act toward his own family. While this rule may be more realistic, it
loses the certainty and comprehensiveness of its predecessor. The new excep-
tion also fails to address disclosure issues, such as those surrounding emer-
gency situations or medical research.
The next revision of the AMA Principles came in 1957.55 In this version,
ethical principles were reduced to ten fundamental concepts. This version was
only one-seventh as long as the 1912 version. The ninth principle addresses
the confidentiality obligation:
A physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him in
the course of medical attendance, or the deficiencies he may observe
in the character of patients, unless he is required to do so by law or
unless it becomes necessary in order to protect the welfare of the in-
dividual or of the community.
5 6
The legal requirement exception that originated in 1903 was retained, and
the concept of a general duty to society was expanded. Disclosures may be
made when necessary to protect the welfare of the individual or of the commu-
54. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 1-2 (1912), reprinted in PERCIVAL'S MEDICAL ETHICS 259, 259-60 (1975).
55. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 1-2 (1957), reprinted in PERCIVAL'S MEDICAL ETHICS 278, 279 (1975).
56. Id
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nity. While this appears to be a more objective standard than the 1912 ver-
sion, the words "necessary," "protect," "welfare," or "community" are not
defined. As a result, the 1957 Principles-issued at a time when interest in the
use of medical information for other purposes was already on the rise-still
left much to be defined by the individual physician.
The Principles were again revised in 198057 and were reduced to eight
fundamental concepts. Confidentiality is covered in the fourth principle: "A
physician shall respect the rights of patients, of colleagues, and of other health
professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences within the constraints of
the law."
58
The need to obey laws requiring disclosure continued to be recognized,
but the references in the previous version to community welfare were dropped.
What remained was a simple affirmation of the obligation to preserve patient
confidentiality without any specific guidance on how to respond to requests for
information from researchers, police, federal agencies, or other potential users
of information. What constitutes a "patient confidence" that is subject to safe-
guarding is not clear.
All of these codes or statements of principles, from the Hippocratic Oath
to the current AMA version, state that protection of confidentiality is an im-
portant obligation of physicians. None of the codes, however, indicates the
complexity of this obligation. In fact, the current AMA statement-which was
drafted when concern about medical confidentiality was high-is quite general
and contains little to guide physicians.
The vagueness of these ethical codes can be illustrated more clearly by
considering how they apply in the case of a particular disclosure. A good ex-
ample is disclosure for use in medical research. Medical research is an impor-
tant aspect of modem medicine and is well supported by the medical
establishment and the federal govemment.59 Identifiable medical records are
essential in the conduct of many types of medical research.
60
It is not surprising that ethical codes predating modem medical research
techniques did not consider the possibility of disclosure for research purposes.
The two most recent AMA statements not only fail to address disclosure to
medical researchers, but also seem to preclude such disclosures. The 1957
statement permitted disclosures required by law or necessary to protect the
welfare of the individual or the community. Disclosures for research would be
consistent with this statement only if the research were determined to be neces-
sary to protect the community. The necessity of each individual research pro-
57. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (1980), reprinted in CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 46, at ix.
58. Id
59. Federal government outlays for health research for fiscal year 1983 were estimated to be
$3.9 billion. This is approximately two-thirds of total health research funding. See U.S. OFFICE
OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, THE UNITED STATES BUDGET IN BRIEF 58 (1982).
60. See Gordis & Gold, Privacy, Confidentiality, and the Use of Medical Records in Research,
207 SCIENCE 153 (1980). See also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 47-54.
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ject would be difficult to demonstrate. The latest AMA restatement seems
more clearly to deny the use of medical information for medical research. It
requires the safeguarding of patient confidences within the constraints of the
law. Since disclosures for research are not legally required, it is difficult to
find justification for such disclosures in the current AMA Principles.
The point here is not that the use of patient information in medical re-
search is forbidden by medical ethics. The AMA supports use of patient
records in medical research.6 1 The point is that the basic statements of ethical
principles are inadequate because they do not appear to permit disclosures of
identifiable medical information for uses that are generally accepted by the
medical establishment and perhaps even by the general public. The courts,
nevertheless, have turned to these codes on occasion for guidance on disclo-
sure questions, and several courts have quoted the Hippocratic Oath in sup-
port of their decisions. 62 There do not appear to be alternative sources of
comprehensive guidance from the medical establishment.
63
With all of the attention focused on privacy in recent years,64 it is as-
tounding that the medical establishment has not made a greater effort to clar-
ify its ethical rules or to offer meaningful guidance to physicians on modern
confidentiality problems. It seems certain that current ethical codes are widely
ignored by physicians.
B. Legal Guidance
Several aspects of physician-patient confidentiality have been addressed
by state legislatures or by Congress. The physician-patient testimonial privi-
lege provides some protection from disclosure during litigation for confidential
communications. State reporting laws define when the disclosure of patient
information is required as a matter of law. A federal law protects the confi-
dentiality of medical records used in drug and alcohol treatment programs.
There are also state laws that regulate the privacy of medical records.
A review of these laws demonstrates that a physician's legislatively de-
fined responsibilities are generally clearer than his or her ethical obligations.
61. Section 4(b)(4) of the AMA model state health care confidentiality law permits disclosure
of patient information for use in health research. CONFIDENTIALITY OF HEALTH CARE INFORMA-
TION ACT § 4(b)(4), reprinted in House Medical Privacy Hearings, supra note 4, at 1143.
62. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801 (N.D. Ohio
1965) ("Almost every member of the public is aware of the promise of discretion contained in the
Hippocratic Oath, and every patient has a right to rely upon this warranty of silence."); Home v.
Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 708, 287 So. 2d 824, 829 (1973) ("When the wording of Alabama's state
licensing statute is considered alongside the accepted precepts of the medical profession itself, it
would seem to establish clearly that public policy in Alabama requires that information obtained
by a physician in the course of a doctor-patient relationship be maintained in confidence, unless
public interest or the private interest of the patient demands otherwise.").
63. The Judicial Council of the American Medical Association has issued opinions on confi-
dentiality. Current opinions deal with press relations (5.03), public disclosures (5.04), attorney-
physician disclosures (5.05), computers and confidentiality (5.06), disclosures to insurance com-
pany representatives (5.07), and employment related disclosures (5.08). See CURRENT OPINIONS
OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 46.
64. See supra note 2.
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Existing laws are far from comprehensive, however, and only occasionally
provide meaningful guidance.
1. Physician-Patient Privilege
Existing law in most states recognizes a physician-patient testimonial
privilege.65 When it applies, this privilege generally provides that the physi-
cian cannot testify about confidential communications with his patient, made
in the course of treatment, unless the patient waives the privilege. The physi-
cian-patient privilege is similar to privileges recognized for confidential com-
munications between attorney and client and between husband and wife.
Unlike these privileges, however, the physician-patient privilege was not rec-
ognized at common law. It was first created by a New York State statute in
1828.66
Because the privilege belongs to the patient and cannot be asserted by the
physician,67 the physician is not forced to decide when he may testify or what
he may testify about. As a result, the privilege is a useful device for resolving
some confidentiality problems that may be faced by physicians. Nevertheless,
a physician may be required to testify notwithstanding the desire of the patient
for confidentiality or the desire of the physician to preserve that confidential-
ity. The reasons why the privilege is of such limited utility derive from the
nature and scope of the privilege.
First, the privilege is a testimonial privilege. It only applies when the
physician is testifying in court or in related proceedings. This represents only
a small fraction of the disclosure demands that may confront a physician. For
most disclosure decisions, the privilege is irrelevant: "The most important
thing to remember about the testimonial privilege is that is has virtually noth-
ing to do with normal, everyday use and disclosure of records maintained by a
medical-care provider. The discretion to disclose or not to disclose, in most
circumstances, resides solely with the provider." 68
Second, the privilege is much narrower than it seems. Statutory exemp-
tions and judicial restrictions have so limited the privilege in many states that
the protections are only rarely available. In California, for example, the privi-
lege does not apply in cases in which the patient puts his condition in issue,
criminal proceedings, will contests, malpractice cases, disciplinary proceed-
ings, or several other types of cases.69 The California statute is not excep-
tional. In recommending against including a physician-patient privilege in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the Judicial Conference Committee found that ex-
ceptions to the privilege in many states are "so numerous as to leave little if
any basis for the privilege." 70
65. See generally J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2380-91 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
66. Id. at § 2380.
67. Id. at § 2386.
68. PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 285.
69. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 996-1007 (West 1966 & Supp. 1983).
70. FED. R. EVID. 504, Advisory Committee's Note (proposed rule), reprinted in S.
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Third, the privilege does not exist in all states. According to the 1977
report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission, forty-three states have
some form of the testimonial privilege.7 1 In some of these states, however, the
privilege is applicable only to psychiatrists and not to other physicians.72 The
privilege is not recognized in federal criminal trials73 or in nondiversity cases
in federal court.
74
Finally, legal commentators have been hostile toward the privilege. Pro-
fessor Wigmore disputes the premises upon which the privilege rests. He
questions whether physician-patient communications are in fact confidential;
whether patients are less communicative in the absence of a privilege; and
whether the injury to the physician-patient relationship as a result of the dis-
closure of confidential communications is greater than the expected benefit to
justice by the disclosure of the communications when relevant in court.75
Wigmore's objections to the privilege arise from his observation that it tends to
be used in those cases-primarily personal injury and life and health insur-
ance-in which the patient voluntarily comes to court. 76 This hostility has
probably discouraged the courts from attempting to turn the privilege into a
more significant protection.
The psychotherapist-patient privilege is more highly regarded than the
physician-patient privilege. The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence, for example, recommended adoption of a psychotherapist-patient
privilege but recommended against adoption of a physician-patient privi-
lege.77 The more favorable reaction toward the psychotherapist privilege ap-
pears to be based on a recognition that confidentiality is of special importance
in the psychiatric relationship.
Furthermore, the physician-patient privilege is of limited utility to a phy-
sician confronted with a disclosure question. The privilege is available only
when the disclosure issue arises in a courtroom. If the privilege is successfully
invoked, the physician cannot testify. Otherwise, his testimony will be re-
SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 757 (2d ed. 1977). The Com-
mittee noted the following exclusions from the privilege: Communications not made for the pur-
poses of diagnosis and treatment; commitment and restoration proceedings; issues about wills or
otherwise between parties claiming by succession from the patient; actions on insurance policies;
required reports (venereal diseases, gunshot wounds, child abuse); communications in furtherance
of crime or fraud; mental or physical condition put in issue by patient (personal injury cases);
malpractice actions; and some or all criminal prosecutions.
The proposals of the Advisory Committee on testimonial privileges were not accepted by the
Congress.
71. PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 284.
72. The State of Florida, for example, is one of a dozen states that recognizes a psychothera-
pist-patient privilege but not a general physician-patient privilege. FLA. STAT. § 90.503 (1979).
Other states are listed in Note, Privacy in Personal Medical Information: A Diagnosis, 33 U. FLA.
L. REV. 394, 395-96 n.9 (1981).
73. United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976).
74. See United States v. Kansas City Lutheran Home & Hosp. Assoc., 297 F. Supp. 239
(W.D. Mo. 1981).
75. J. WIGMORE, supra note 65, at §§ 2380a, 2285.
76. J. WIGMORE, supra note 65, at § 2380a.
77. Advisory Commitee's Note, supra note 70, reprinted in S. SALTZBURO & K. REDDEN,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL at 757-58.
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quired. The privilege provides no help to a physician who has to decide on the
propriety of a disclosure outside of the courtroom.
2. Reporting Statutes
Every state requires health care providers to report selected identifiable
patient information to state agencies. Reportable information may include
communicable diseases, violent injuries (e.g., gunshot wounds), occupational
diseases or injuries, epilepsy, congenital defects, and injuries from child abuse
or neglect.78 In addition, an increasing number of states require the reporting
of information relating to abortions, certain prescription drugs, cancer, and
battered adults. The number of reportable medical conditions has increased
in recent years.
79
Each statute reflects a state legislature's judgment that a patient's interest
in the confidentiality of his medical condition is outweighed by another socie-
tal interest. The interest that is served by the disclosure depends on the nature
of the information and the agency that receives it. For example, communica-
ble disease information may be used by public health agencies to institute con-
trol measures to interrupt the transmission of disease. The reporting of
gunshot wounds to police agencies assists in the identification of crimes and
criminals. Cancer data may be collected for use in medical research.
Like the physician-patient privilege, state reporting laws resolve selected
confidentiality problems. Whatever the physician's obligations to protect a pa-
tient's confidential communications, he or she clearly must obey the law of the
state. When state reporting requirements apply, physicians do not have to de-
cide on a case-by-case basis-as called for in the 1912 AMA Principles-
whether an undefined "duty to society" 80 requires that patient information be
disclosed.
The growing number of reporting laws also raises a related issue. Does
the legal requirement to disclose otherwise confidential patient information
create an obligation on the part of the physician to inform the patient that the
disclosure will be made? The physician who informs a patient suspected of
having a communicable disease that the state will be notified may find that the
patient will refuse treatment, will accept treatment only on condition that the
physician not report the disease, or will not seek treatment in the future.
Avoidance of these undesirable consequences is a primary reason why confi-
dentiality is important in the treatment process.
A physician can resolve the question of informing the patient of the re-
porting requirement in several ways without directly informing the patient
that his disease will be reported to the state. First, since neither state law nor
medical ethics require that the patient be told of the disclosure, a physician
might conclude that there is no obligation to tell the patient. Second, relying
78. See generaly NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONFIDENTIALITY or HEALTH RECORDS,
supra note 2.
79. Id. at 2-3.
80. See supra text accompanying note 54.
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on the assumption that everyone has notice of the law,8 a physician might
deny that there is a problem by reasoning that the patient already knows that
the disclosure will be made. Third, a physician might define his confidential-
ity obligation so that it only applies in the absence of state law. In other
words, a physician's obligations only begin after required disclosures have
been considered. None of these resolutions is satisfactory. The patient who is
not informed of the disclosure and who is later contacted by a public health
agency or learns of the disclosure in some other way may feel betrayed by his
physician. This could significantly impair, or even end, the physician-patient
relationship. Thus, whether or not a physician informs his patient of the re-
porting law, there is some risk of interfering with the medical treatment pro-
cess, disrupting the physician-patient relationship, or both. So while state
reporting laws do resolve at least some confidentiality problems for physicians,
these laws create other problems.
By being forced to be an agent8 2 of the state for the purpose of protecting
the public health, enforcing criminal laws, or for other reasons, the physician
is faced with conflicting goals that have only been partially resolved by legisla-
tion. Both patients and physicians seem to accept the need for reporting some
communicable diseases. As reporting expands to include abortion informa-
tion, drug prescriptions, cancer, and "dangerous" patients, however, the con-
fficts that physicians confront will increase.8
3
3. Federal Alcohol and Drug Abuse Confidentiality Rules
There is little general federal law on the confidentiality of medical
records.84 Federal Medicare regulations provide that hospital records are con-
81. The Privacy Protection Study Commission recommended that patients be given notice by
the health care provider of all disclosures of medical information that might be made without the
consent of the patient. PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 313-14. See also S. 503,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1979); H.R. 5935, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 113 (1979).
82. Dr. John F. Burnum cites treatment of venereal disease as one of many instances in
which the physician "may be forced to wear two hats and to be thrown into mild ethical conflict."
Dr. Burnum uses the term "double agent" to describe the role of the physician in such instances.
Burnum, The Physician as a Double Agent, 297 NEw ENG. J. OF MEDICINE 278 (1977).
83. The collection of information on patients afflicted with acquired immune deficiency syn-
drome (AIDS) provides a current example of the conflict between the privacy of patients and the
ability of government epidemiologists to study the spread of the disease. Since many of the identi-
fied victims of AIDS are homosexual, patients are especially concerned about what information is
collected, how much of it is identifiable, and how it might be redisclosed. See Barton Gellman,
Tracing AIDS Cases Raises Privacy Issue, Wash. Post, July 18, 1983, at Al, col. 3.
84. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982), provides rules for the disclosure of
medical records maintained by federal agencies as part of a general scheme of regulation of fed-
eral record keeping practices. The Privacy Act applies to federal executive departments, military
departments, government corporations, government controlled corporations, other establishments
in the executive branch of government, and independent regulatory agencies. Id at §§ 552a
(a)(l), 552(e), 551(l).
When an agency provides by contract for a system of records containing information about
individuals to be operated on behalf of the agency, the contractor must comply with the Privacy
Act's requirements. Id § 552a(m). Thus, it is possible for a nonfederal entity to be required to
comply with the Privacy Act for records maintained in connection with federal contracts.
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fidential and prohibits disclosure without the written consent of the patient.
8 5
It seems doubtful that this strict rule is followed, 86 and one court that consid-
ered it did not find "any intention on the part of Congress to make patient
medical records any less available than they would normally be."
87
The only federal statutes that provide any detailed confidentiality rules
for medical records are the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism
Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act88 and the Drug Abuse Office
and Treatment Act of 1972.89 These laws, which are substantially identical
and have a common set of regulations,9" apply to medical records maintained
in connection with the performance of any alcohol abuse or drug abuse pre-
vention function conducted, funded, authorized, or assisted by the federal gov-
ernment. Assistance includes allowing income tax deductions for contributions
or granting tax-exempt status.9 1
For covered alcohol and drug abuse records, the laws recognize three cat-
egories of disclosures that may be made without the consent of the patient.
The first is to medical personnel to the extent necessary to meet a bona fide
medical emergency. 92 The second is to qualified personnel for the purpose of
conducting scientific research, management audits, financial audits, or pro-
gram evaluation. Such personnel, however, are expressly prohibited from
identifying, either directly or indirectly, individual patients in any manner
whatsoever.93 The third category of permissible disclosure consists of the dis-
closures that may be made only if authorized by an appropriate order of a
court after an application showing good cause. The law directs the court, in
assessing good cause, to weigh the public interest and the need for disclosure
85. A medical record is maintained for every patient admitted for care in the hospital.
Such records are kept confidential. The factors explaining the standard are as follows:
(1) Only authorized personnel have access to the record.
(2) Written consent of the patient is presented as authority for release of medical
information.
(3) Medical records generally are not removed from the hospital environment except
upon subpoena.
42 C.F.R. § 405.1026(a) (1982).
86. Nathan Hershey, Professor of Health Law, Graduate School of Public Health, University
of Pittsburgh, asked the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) of the Department of
Health and Human Services whether this regulation would permit the disclosure of identifiable
medical records to epidemiological researchers. The HCFA responded that the regulations were
not intended to preclude a hospital from participating in appropriate epidemiological research, if
necessary precautions were taken to ensure the confidentiality of records. A hospital would not
violate the regulations as long as appropriate measures were taken to ensure that records were not
misused, that the study was valid, and that the patient's privacy was protected. In commenting on
the response, Professor Hershey wisely noted that a court interpreting the regulation might reach a
different result in a private legal action brought by a patient whose records were made available to
researchers without his or her consent. See Hershey, Using Patient Recordsfor Research: The
Responsefrom FederalAgencdes and the State of Pennsylvania, 4 IRB 7 (1981). See also infra note
II1.
87. United States v. Providence Hosp., 507 F. Supp. 519, 520 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 4582 (1976).
89. 21 U.S.C. § 1175 (1976).
90. See 42 C.F.R. §2.1 to .67-1 (1982).
91. Id. at § 2.12 (a)(4).
92. 21 U.S.C. § 1175(b)(2)(A) (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 4582(b)(2)(A) (1976).
93. 21 U.S.C. § 1175(b)(2)(B) (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 4582(b)(2)(B) (1976).
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against the injury to the patient, to the physician-patient relationship, and to
the treatment services. The court is specifically directed to impose appropriate
safeguards against unauthorized disclosure.
94
Although they apply to only a very selected set of medical records, the
alcohol and drug abuse confidentiality rules meet the minimum criteria estab-
lished earlier for comprehensive guidance.95 Certain categories of disclosures
are permitted under the law, and all others are prohibited unless approved by
a court. For all disclosure questions that arise, a physician has some direction.
When the statute uses an undefined phrase such as "qualified personnel,"
more detailed guidance is provided in the regulations issued by the Public
Health Service.
96
The need for separate confidentiality rules for a class of medical records
considered to be especially sensitive supports two main points of this Article.
First, the existence of these rules suggests that the rules for ordinary medical
records either are not well defined or are too weak to satisfy a class of patients
who can reasonably be expected to be concerned about confidentiality. The
establishment of special "strict" confidentiality rules for some records may
also suggest legislative agreement that weaker rules for ordinary records are
appropriate. Second, the drug and alcohol rules illustrate the intense pressure
to make medical records available for other purposes. Despite specific legisla-
tive recognition of the critical importance of confidentiality to the operation of
drug and alcohol treatment programs, the law still allows disclosures without
the consent or knowledge of the patient in a surprisingly wide range of
circumstances.
9 7
94. 21 U.S.C. § 1175(b)(2)(C) (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 4582(b)(2)(C) (1976). In one case in which
the IRS had issued a subpoena for patient records, a hospital argued that the subpoena might
cover records of patients that were covered by 21 U.S.C. § 1175. Although the court found no
indication that any records covered by the subpoena might be subject to the confidentiality provi-
sions, it found that, given the narrow scope of the inquiry, the public interest in collecting taxes
outweighed the potential injury of a disclosure to a drug-abuse treatment patient. No safeguards
against unauthorized disclosure were imposed. See United States v. Providence Hosp., 507 F.
Supp. 519 (E.D. Mich. 1981). See also infra note 153 and accompanying text. This decision illus-
trates that the confidentiality protections afforded by court review depend on how individual
judges interpret "good cause."
95. See supra text accompanying notes 42 & 43.
96. 42 C.F.R. § 2.52(a) (1982).
97. Although the drug and alcohol laws may provide comprehensive guidance to physicians,
they should not necessarily serve as a model for other types of medical records. On the contrary,
there are significant deficiencies in the law and inconsistencies in the regulations. For example,
the law only permits nonconsensual disclosure of information in the event of medical emergencies
to medical personnel. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. Disclosure to relatives appears
to be prohibited. This is a potentially serious defect, since there may be times when it is necessary
or appropriate to discuss a patient's treatment with his family and it is not possible or practical to
obtain written consent. Notwithstanding the clear language of the statute, the regulations solve
this problem by authorizing disclosure in the event of medical emergencies to family members or
other persons with whom the patient is known to have a responsible personal relationship. 42
C.F.R. § 2.51(d) (1982). Although the result may be appropriate, the length to which the regula-
tion drafters have had to twist the statute in order to reach the proper result illustrates some of the
shortcomings of the law.
19841
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
4. State Confidentiality Laws
There is tremendous variation in the number and quality of state laws on
medical confidentiality. A 1979 review by the National Commission on Confi-
dentiality of Health Records (NCCHR) of laws on the maintenance, use, and
disclosure of personally identified patient information found that Vermont
had seven such laws, but that Hawaii had thirty-nine.98 In order to illustrate
the disparity among state medical privacy laws, one of the more comprehen-
sive and recent state medical confidentiality laws (Rhode Island) will be com-
pared with one of the less sophisticated approaches (Minnesota). State
medical confidentiality laws tend to be similar to either the Rhode Island or
Minnesota models.
In 1978 Rhode Island passed a confidentiality of health care information
act based on the American Medical Association model state legislation.99 The
law applies to any persons licensed by the state to provide health care serv-
ices, l°0 including physicians and hospitals, and restricts disclosures of "confi-
dential health care information." This restriction includes "all information
relating to a patient's health care history, diagnosis, condition, treatment, or
evaluation."101
The Rhode Island law prohibits disclosure of confidential health care in-
formation without the written consent of the patient, except in fourteen speci-
fied situations102 such as medical emergencies, adjudication of health
insurance claims by third party insurers, public health functions, and peer re-
view. Disclosures to law enforcement personnel are permitted under narrowly
defined circumstances, and disclosure to researchers and auditors are allowed,
provided that the personnel receiving the records are "qualified." The law
places limitations upon the maintenance, transfer, and use of health care infor-
mation by third party recipients.103
The law also provides that confidential health care information shall not
be subject to compulsory legal process in any civil, criminal, legislative, or
administrative proceeding except for court ordered psychiatric examinations,
civil or criminal commitment proceedings, cases in which an individual in-
troduces his physical or mental condition, cases in which a court has deter-
mined that an individual's mental or physical condition is of an imminent and
serious danger to another, or in policy actions brought by an individual
against his insurance carrier. 1°4
For a physician, the Rhode Island law provides nearly complete guidance
98. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONFIDENTIALITY OF HEALTH RECORDS, supra note 2, at 17-
19, 54. North Carolina was between the extremes with twenty-one laws. The wide variation in
number of state laws on confidentiality is reflective in part of the organization of law in each state
code. See HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 29.
99. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-1 (Supp. 1982).
100. Id. at § 5-37.3-3(a).
101. Id. at § 5-37.3-3(c).
102. Id. at § 5-37.3-4(b).
103. Id. at § 5-37.3-4(c).
104. Id. at § 5-37.3-6.
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for the disclosure of patient information. It tells the physician to whom and
under what circumstances information can be disclosed. This is not to say that
the policy choices made in the law are necessarily consistent, complete, or suf-
ficiently protective of the interests of the patient, the physician, or other users
of health care information. The law is not totally comprehensive, because a
state cannot intrude on the power of the federal government to compel disclo-
sure of information needed in connection with federal programs. 10 5 This is an
inherent limitation on state authority, and, given the broad authority of fed-
eral agencies to acquire identifiable patient information, 10 6 it is a significant
limitation.
The Rhode Island law is similar to laws recently passed in California
0 7
and Montana. 0 8 Other states have enacted very limited confidentiality laws.
A representative example is Minnesota. The only general health care informa-
tion confidentiality provision in Minnesota law is found in the patient's bill of
rights for hospitals and nursing homes. The law provides: "Every patient and
resident shall be assured confidential treatment of his personal and medical
records, and may approve or refuse their release to any individual outside the
facility, except as otherwise provided by law or a third party payment con-
tract." 109 This simple provision provides little guidance for physicians and
probably little protection for patients. Although the Minnesota bill of rights is
a relatively new enactment, its confidentiality approach is representative of
older, general confidentiality laws. Similar laws can be found in Massachu-
settso and Pennsylvania."'
A 1979 review of state laws concerning health records confidentiality by
the National Commission on Confidentiality of Health Records (NCCHR)
concluded that the great majority of states had not adopted comprehensive
statutes to regulate the record keeping practices of health care providers. 12
105. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 30.
106. See infra notes 143-57 and accompanying text.
107. CAL. CrV. CODE § 56 (West 1982).
108. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-301 (1981).
109. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.651(15) (West Supp. 1982).
110. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 70E (West Supp. 1981).
111. 28 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 103.22(4) (1981). The Pennsylvania patient bill of rights is part of
the state Administrative Code. The Pennsylvania Hospital Rules and Regulations also contain a
confidentiality rule. It provides in part: "All records shall be treated as confidential. Only au-
thorized personnel shall have access to the records." Id. § 115.27.
When the Pennsylvania Department of Health was asked by Professor Nathan Hershey
whether either confidentiality regulation would preclude disclosure of identifiable patient records
to epidemiological researchers, the Department stated that a researcher could become an "author-
ized person" within the meaning of the regulations after review and approval of the request by the
medical staff and chief executive officer of a hospital. Professor Hershey points out that other state
laws or regulations might be interpreted differently by state officials or by the courts. See Her-
shey, supra note 86.
The need for a strained interpretation of the Pennsylvania regulations by the State Depart-
ment of Health in order to justify a socially desirable use of medical records illustrates the short-
comings of simple confidentiality rules, as well as the problems both physicians and patients may
encounter in relying on these rules.
112. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONFIDENTIALITY OF HEALTH REcoRDs, supra note 2, at I-
2.
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The NCCHR found that the broadly-framed statutes were not likely to be
aggressively enforced," 3 and George J. Annas, Associate Professor of Law
and Medicine at the Boston University Schools of Medicine and Public
Health, has concluded that health professionals seldom know the law of their
own states."14 The NCCHR also found that record keeping laws for mental
health records tended to contain more detailed confidentiality standards."t 5
Although a number of states, such as Rhode Island, have passed modern,
general health records confidentiality laws since the NCCHR survey, there are
some inherent limitations of legislation passed at the state level. The difficulty
of limiting federal government access to records has already been men-
tioned."16 Another problem with state-by-state regulation of record keeping
practices is caused by the frequency of the interstate movement of records,
patients, and physicians. The issues that arise from interstate movement can
be illustrated by a brief example. A patient who lives in Maryland and is
treated by a physician who has offices in both Maryland and the District of
Columbia is referred to a physician who practices in Virginia. As records and
patient information are passed back and forth between physicians, it can be-
come more and more difficult for the physicians and the patient to determine
which jurisdiction's law applies at what time.
Although this determination is likely to be irrelevant for routine treat-
ment purposes, if each state has different rules and procedures governing the
disclosure of the records, the legal problems could be complex. Similar issues
are presented by the movement of physicians and their records from one state
to another. These problems are largely unexplored.
Overall, it is difficult to generalize about the adequacy of state medical
records confidentiality laws. A House committee that considered a federal
medical privacy bill concluded in 1980 that "most States do not have well
defined, modern laws on the confidentiality of medical records.""t 7 Obviously,
some states have more comprehensive laws than others. The newer laws have
not been sufficiently tested in practice, or in the courts, to determine how well
they will work. Current state laws will only sometimes provide guidance for
physicians faced with disclosure decisions.
III. PHYSICIANS AND CONFIDENTIALITY: ISSUES TO CONSIDER WHEN
RECORDS ARE SOUGHT
Many of the disclosures of identifiable medical information that occur
routinely today are made with the consent of the patient. Disclosures to third
party payors account for the majority of all disclosures, 18 and health insurers
113. Id. at 6.
114. Id. at iv.
115. Id. at 5. Confidentiality laws exclusively devoted to the protection of mental health
records were recently enacted in the District of Columbia. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2001 to -2076
(1981). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 , § 801 (Smith-Hurd 1982-83).
116. See HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 30.
117. HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 29.
118. See supra notes 15-17, 28 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 62
MEDICAL RECORDS PRVACY
normally obtain consent from the claimant as a prerequisite to payment.' 19 A
physician who makes a disclosure to a health insurer with a patient's written
consent faces fewer legal and ethical confidentiality questions.'
20
A growing number of requests for disclosure of patient information are
not accompanied by the patient's written consent. Many of these requests
have already been mentioned.' 2 Some are for health-related purposes, such
as peer review, fraud and abuse investigations, management and utilization
controls, and medical research. Other requests, unrelated to health care, may
come from law enforcement or intelligence agencies, the Secret Service,
schools, and others.
These disclosures present the most difficult problems for conscientious
physicians. Some requesters simply will ask the physician for his cooperation
in making patient records available. For purposes of this Article, these will be
categorized as disclosures within the discretion of the physician. 122 Others
seeking patient information will have the power to compel production of pa-
tient records. These will be categorized as compulsory disclosures. Each type
of request presents a different and potentially complex confidentiality issue.
A. Discretionary Disclosures
1. Making the Decision
When a patient has not requested that medical information be disclosed
and disclosure is not required by law, any disclosure is at the discretion of the
physician. A physician who denies all requests for the exercise of that discre-
tion will minimize problems with confidentiality issues.
Physicians may not find it easy to refuse automatically all discretionary
disclosures. For example, one type of request that some physicians may find
more compelling than most is a request for information to be used in medical
research. Identifiable patient information is frequently crucial to medical re-
search, and it is not always possible or practical to obtain patient consent.
23
In fact, the results of some research may be biased if information is unavaila-
ble because access was denied by either the physician or the patient. 24 Public
119. See House Medical Privacy Hearings, supra note 4, at 554 (statement of Marshall R.
Crawford, Senior Director, Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association).
120. This is not to suggest that there are no legal or ethical questions attached to consesual
disclosures. The ease with which patients sign away their confidentiality rights is sufficiently
troubling that some restrictions may eventually be determined to be appropriate. Because, how-
ever, there are so many unresolved difficulties over non-consensual disclosures, consideration of
the issues surrounding consensual disclosures must be left to the future.
121. See supra text accompanying note 28.
122. The concept of a discretionary disclosure is not intended to suggest that a physician is
completely unrestricted in making a disclosure decision. Legal or ethical principles may influence
or direct the result, although it has already been demonstrated that physicians will find little help
in the law or in medical ethics. See supra text accompanying notes 44-117. The term "discretion-
ary" was selected primarily to identify disclosures that are not required by legal process.
123. Gordis & Gold, supra note 60, at 154 ("Much population-based research would be very
difficult to carry out if prior patient consent were required in order for the investigator to have
access to medical records."). See also House Report, supra note 1, at 47-54.
124. House Medical Privacy Hearings, supra note 4, at 464 (statement of Dr. Leon Gordis,
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health officials, who may need patient information to assist in the identifica-
tion of specific health problems and to institute control measures to interrupt
the transmission of disease, can make an even more compelling case for disclo-
sure of records.
The cautious physician who chooses to make information available to re-
searchers or others should consider placing restrictions on the maintenance
and use of the information.125 Generally, the most important issues are how
identifiable patient information will be used, stored, and destroyed; and under
what circumstances identifiable data may be redisclosed. 126 Deciding on the
conditions that apply when patient information is to be disclosed can be com-
plicated, and it is likely that most physicians simply rely on the professional-
ism of the recipient to safeguard the data.
The physician who fails to impose conditions on the use of patient infor-
mation disclosed to researchers faces the possibility of being sued if the data is
misused. Fear of liability for disclosure of patient information has already
Society for Epidemiological Research and Association of American Medical Colleges); House
REPORT, supra note 1, at 50-51.
125. When the Department of Health and Human Services makes individually identifiable
records available to researchers, the Department meets its obligations under the Privacy Act of
1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982), through a series of procedural and substantive prerequisites to dis-
closure. The prerequisites that apply to the system of records containing the research subjects data
record maintained by Saint Elizabeth's Hospital, which is operated by the Department, are
representative:
A record may be disclosed for a research purpose, when the Department:
(A) has determined that the use or disclosure does not violate legal or policy limita-
tions under which the record was provided, collected, or obtained;
(B) has determined that the research purpose (I) cannot be reasonably accomplished
unless the record is provided in individually identifiable form, and (2) warrants the risk
to the privacy of the individual that additional exposure of the record might bring;
(C) has required the recipient to-4() establish reasonable administrative, technical,
and physical safeguards to prevent unauthorized use or disclosure of the record, and (2)
remove or destroy the information that identifies the individual at the earliest time at
which removal or destruction can be accomplished consistent with the purpose of the
research project, unless the recipient has presented adequate justification of a research or
health nature for retaining such information, and (3) make no further use or disclosure
of the record except-(a) in emergency circumstances affecting the health or safety of
any individual, (b) for use in another research project, under these same conditions, and
with written authorization of the Department, (c) for disclosure to a properly identified
person for the purpose of an audit related to the research project, if information that
would enable research subjects to be identified is removed or destroyed at the earliest
opportunity consistent with the purpose of the audit, or (d) when required by law;
(D) has secured a written statement attesting to the recipient's understanding of, and
willingness to abide by these provisions.
Saint Elizabeth's Hospital Research Subjects Data Record System of Records, Routine Use 4,
reprinted in I OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, PRIVACY ACT ISSUANCES, 1981 Compilation
347-48 (1981) (System number 09-30-0005).
126. For research involving human subjects conducted or funded by the Department of
Health and Human Services, an institutional review board, established in accordance with federal
regulations, must approve the research and must, among other things, determine that there are
adequate provisions to protect the privacy of subjects and to maintain the confidentiality of data.
45 C.F.R. § 46.11 l(a)(7) (1981). See generall, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.306 (1982). The review might
include an examination of the conditions under which identifiable data is maintained. Neverthe-
less, a physician who discloses information for use in research that has been approved by an




made some hospitals reluctant to provide data to researchers. 127 In the absence
of a statute or other direction, perhaps from a professional society, a physician
who discloses patient information must accept a real, although small, risk of
legal liability to his patient.' 28
Sympathy with the intended use of information is not the only reason a
physician might consider in making a disclosure. In some instances, a physi-
cian may be liable for failing to disclose patient information. This was the
holding in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of Cal#fornia.129 In that contro-
versial decision, the California Supreme Court held that a psychiatrist could
be liable to a third party for failing to warn the third party that a patient was
dangerous. The court found that a psychiatrist had a duty to exercise reason-
able care to protect an individual who might be harmed by a patient.130
Psychiatrists argue strongly that confidentiality of patient communica-
tions is essential to their practice.' 3 ' Tarasoff raises the possibility that a psy-
chiatrist or other physician might be liable not only for disclosing confidential
information, but also for failing to disclose confidential information. This pos-
127. Dr. Leon Gordis, Chairman of the Department of Epidemiology at Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity, indicated that concern over possible liability as a result of nonconsensual disclosures of
patient information is frequently the basis of refusals to provide information to health researchers.
In one instance, a hospital asked the researcher and his sponsor to agree to indemnify the hospital
against any claims made by any patient as a result of the release of patient information. See
Letter from Dr. Leon Gordis to Rep. Richardson Preyer (June 6, 1979), reprintedin House Medical
Privacy Hearings, supra note 4, at 471-72. See also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 78.
128. In the past, attempts by third parties to obtain records maintained by researchers were
rare or unknown. As a result, the possibility of physician liability for disclosure to a researcher
was remote. More recently, however, several lawsuits have been filed seeking access to researcher
records. Two cases were reported in the press in the last several years. In one case, the Justice
Department sued the New York State Health Department to compel disclosure of confidential
studies of people living near the Love Canal area of New York. N.Y. Times, June 6, 1980, at B1,
col. 4. In a second case, Proctor and Gamble sued the Center for Disease Control to obtain the
names of women who were telephoned in studies of toxic shock syndrome. Wall St. J., Nov. 5,
1982, at 18, col. 1. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of these cases is that the United States is the
plaintiff in one action and the defendant in the other.
The Carter Administration was concerned enough about the confidentiality of research
records to propose legislation. See H.R. 3409, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). The Carter proposal
was based on the recommendations of the Privacy Protection Study Commission. See PRIVACY
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 567-604. The legislation never received a hearing.
129. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
130. One of the most disputed aspects of Tarasoff was the court's acceptance of the proposi-
tion that psychiatrists are sometimes able to accurately predict whether a patient will resort to
violence. Based on its determination that psychiatrists had such an ability-at least under the
peculiar facts of the case--the court decided that a duty to warn also existed. Psychiatrists argue
strongly that accurate predictions cannot be made. The California Supreme Court noted that the
American Psychiatric Association and other professional societies contended that therapists are
unable to predict violent acts reliably. The court acknowledged the difficulty but found it irrele-
vant to the case because the psychiatrist had, in fact, accurately predicted that the patientW sented a serious threat of violence. Id. at 437-38, 551 P.2d at 344-45, 131 Cal Rptr. at 24-25.
e court stated the general rule that "[w]ithin the broad range of reasonable practice and treat-
ment in which professional opinion and judgment may differ, the therapist is free to exercise his or
her own best judgment without liability; proof, aided by hindsight, that he or she judged wrongly
is insufficient to establish negligence." Id. at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25. On the
general question of predictions of dangerousness by psychiatrists, see, e.g., Cocozza & Steadman,
The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29
RUTGERS L. REv. 1084 (1976); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise:
F1iping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. Rav. 693 (1974).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
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sibility dramatically illustrates one of the uncertainties physicians face with
respect to the protection of patient confidentiality. The clash between two im-
portant social interests--confidentiality on the one hand and the protection of
life and limb on the other-is left to the physician to resolve, and the physician
may be held responsible for his resolution.
2. Disclosure Dilemma
The dilemma that is presented by requests for disclosure can be illus-
trated by considering the use of medical information by the United States Se-
cret Service in connection with the protection of public officials.' 32 The Secret
Service routinely uses medical information to assess individuals who may pose
a threat to the security of the President, other high public officials, candidates
for public office, and their relatives.133 The Secret Service contends that medi-
cal information is necessary to carry out this function, 134 and there is some
congressional agreement. 135 In support of its use of medical information, the
Secret Service cites the fact that more than 90 percent of those considered to be
dangerous have a known history of mental problems. 136 Typically, the Service
will ask a psychiatrist to evaluate a specific individual's propensity for vio-
lence. The majority of psychiatrists approached by the Secret Service seem to
agree that there is a legitimate need for the information, and there appears to
be a high degree of cooperation with requests for patient information. 37 Pa-
tient consent for the disclosure is only occasionally possible.
A psychiatrist or other physician who is approached by a Secret Service
agent seeking patient information is under no statutory obligation to cooper-
ate. In fact, some state laws may prohibit or restrict psychiatrists in state
mental hospitals or elsewhere from disclosing some or all patient information
to the Secret Service. 138 For most psychiatrists, however, as for most physi-
132. The Secret Service's protective functions are set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3056 (1976).
133. On the general issue of use of medical information by the Secret Service, see generally
House MedicalPrivacy Hearings supra note 4, at 732-35 (statement of H. Stuart Knight, Director,
United States Secret Service).
134. Id. at 733.
135. All congressional committees that considered medical privacy legislation during the 96th
Congress recommended that disclosure of medical information to the Secret Service be permitted.
See Housa REPORT, supra note 1, at 63-65; SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 22-23; H.R. REP.
No. 832 pt. 2, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1980).
136. House Medical Privacy Hearings, supra note 4, at 729 (statement of Bette B. Anderson,
Under Secretary of the Treasury).
137. HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 63.
138. The Director of the Secret Service testified that the cooperation varies from state to state.
He indicated that Texas and Massachusetts have basically the same law, but that as a result of
local interpretations, Texas officials are cooperative, whereas in Massachusetts, the Secret Service
does not receive information. House Medical Privacy Hearings, supra note 4, at 739 (statement of
H. Stuart Knight, Director, United States Secret Service).
In 1978 Illinois passed the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act
which included a restriction on disclosure of information to the Secret Service. The only informa-
tion that could be disclosed by the State Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disa-
bilities was the patient's name, address, age, and date of admission to, or discharge from, a
Department facility. Ill. Laws P.A. 80-1508, § 12(a) (1979).
In 1981 the provision was amended to permit disclosure of "any information which would
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cians facing similar questions, there is little guidance, and the decision is a
personal one.
Is the disclosure of patient information to the Secret Service a violation of
medical confidentiality principles? If the patient is, in fact, reasonably judged
to be a danger, then a physician may feel justified in making the disclosure.
139
This is consistent with the holding in Tarasoff and with the current practice of
psychiatrists. Confidentiality gives way to an overriding public interest in the
protection of public officials.
While this is a reasonable, balanced solution to the question of disclosing
information about a patient judged to be a danger, is the same result appropri-
ate if the patient is not dangerous? What should a psychiatrist reveal when the
Secret Service inquires about a patient who, in the opinion of the psychiatrist,
is not a danger? If the disclosure of any confidential information is justified
only by an overriding public interest, then it is difficult to justify disclosure of
any information about a patient in the absence of such an interest.
If requests by the Secret Service for patient information were always gen-
eral (for example, "Are any of your patients threats to the President?"), then
concern over disclosing information by a negative answer would be mini-
mized. No patients would be identified by a negative answer. The Secret
Service, however, frequently asks for information about specific patients. Can
a psychiatrist agree to cooperate with the Secret Service only in those instances
in which a patient is a danger, and refuse to disclose information when the
patient is not? If the terms of cooperation are clearly understood by all, then
the answer is no. If a psychiatrist responds positively when asked if a particu-
lar patient is a threat but answers "no comment" otherwise, then that refusal
to discuss a specific patient's propensity for violence is the equivalent of saying
that the patient is not violent. In other words, it is difficult to limit disclosures
about specific patients to those circumstances in which patients are a threat to
others.
While we may be willing to overlook the confidentiality interests of the
dangerous patient because of the greater public interest, it is not as easy to
reach the same result in the case of nondangerous patients. Certainly many
patients would object to disclosure of the basic fact that they are undergoing
psychiatric treatment.140 For a psychiatrist to share his judgments about a
indicate whether or not the [patient] has a history of violence or presents a danger of violence" to a
person under Secret Service protection. The amended law restricts use of the information to in-
vestigative purposes and prohibits its public dissemination. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 911/2, § 812
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983).
The additional information permitted to be disclosed by the 1981 amendment is consistent
with the type of information that the Secret Service stated that it needed. See House Medical
Privacy Hearings, supra note 4, at 727-31 (statement of Bette B. Anderson, Under Secretary of the
Treasury), 732-35 (statement of H. Stuart Knight, Director, United States Secret Service).
139. It is hardly clear that patients would agree with the reasonableness of the disclosure, and
a psychiatrist who told his patients that he cooperated with the Secret Service might well lose
patients as a result.
140. See supra note 14.
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patient's behavior or mental condition (for example, "John Smith is not a
threat to the President") would be even more objectionable.
This disclosure dilemma arises because the Secret Service is actively seek-
ing information. In Tarasoff the issue was whether the psychiatrist had a duty
to make a self-initiated disclosure. Failure to make a self-initiated disclosure
reveals nothing about a patient because nothing is disclosed. When informa-
tion is actively sought from a physician by a third party, however, the potential
exists for an ethical dilemma. Once a physician has agreed to disclose patient
information under defined conditions, no matter how justifiable that disclo-
sure may be, the physician may find that a denial of a request to disclose
information on other patients will nevertheless reveal at least some informa-
tion about those patients.
The number of requests made by the Secret Service each year is relatively
small. 141 The same problem can result when requests for information are
made by other law enforcement agencies, however. The slippery slope in this
area is particularly steep. Once cooperation begins, it is hard to find a place to
stop. If confidentiality can be breached to prevent a murder, can it be
breached to apprehend a murderer? Can confidentiality be breached to pre-
vent a crime of lesser magnitude or to locate the criminal? Can confidentiality
be breached to collect information on people who are suspicious or who have
criminal records or tendencies? While physicians might have no difficulty in
refusing such requests for information, not all of the circumstances are readily
distinguishable from Tarasoff or from the Secret Service requests. Without
firm guidelines, there is a danger that law enforcement agencies could have
more access to patient information than either patients or physicians ever
thought possible or desirable. 142
These questions are among the most complex discretionary disclosure is-
sues confronting physicians. None of the alternatives is consistent with all
principles. For the average physician, they may arise only rarely. They can be
ignored by the physician who refuses to make any discretionary disclosures. It
seems unlikly, however, that all physicians would be so resolute. If psychia-
trists-who are generally very protective of patient confidences--cooperate in
large numbers with the Secret Service, then it is likely that other physicians
would be equally cooperative.
Regardless of the decision of a physician on any particular disclosure re-
quest-whether the requester is the Secret Service, a fraud investigator, a med-
ical researcher, an intelligence agency, or someone else-the physician
generally faces the decision without any meaningful guidance. Basic princi-
141. In 1979 the Director of the Secret Service testified that the Service conducted less than
4000 investigations a year. House Medical Privacy Hearings, supra note 4, at 736-37.
142. Disclosures of confidential medical information can be controlled by placing restrictions
on the activities of the record keepers. This is a traditional strategy. Another approach that may
be suitable in some instances is limiting the ability of law enforcement or other agencies to request
medical information. This approach was incorporated in § 131 of H.R. 5935, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980). In order to request medical information, the legislation would have required law enforce-
ment agencies to certify in writing that the information was being sought for one of five purposes
specifically permitted under the bill. See also HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 67-69.
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ples of medical ethics are silent on these issues, and the law is filled with un-
certainties about the potential liabilities of physicians who must decide
whether to disclose patient information.
B. Compulsory Disclosures
Given the complex issues presented by requests for discretionary disclo-
sure of patient information, it appears that receipt by a physician of a sum-
mons, subpoena, or search warrant would simplify disclosure problems for the
physician. But the physician who complies with such a request may be doing
a disservice to his patients and ignoring his responsibility to protect the confi-
dentiality of his records.
1. Who Can Compel Disclosure of Medical Records?
Traditionally, compulsory process has been used to obtain medical
records in private litigation to which the patient is usually a party. When the
patient is a party to the litigation, he is able to defend his own interest in
confidentiality, and the physician may have no special responsibility.
The possibility that compulsory process will be used to obtain medical
records can no longer be dismissed as limited to private litigation. The growth
of government involvement in health matters has resulted in an expansion of
the power of government agencies to compel the production of records. For
example, the Secretary of Health and Human Services has general subpoena
authority under the Social Security Act in connection with the Federal Old-
Age, Survivors, and Disability Program143 and the Medicare Program. 44 The
Inspector General of Health and Human Services also has general subpoena
power 145 in connection with his responsibility to promote economy and effi-
ciency in Department programs and to prevent and detect fraud and abuse. 146
The Food and Drug Administration also has a legal right to records main-
tained in connection with new drug applications. 147 While there is no formal
subpoena power under the law, the Secretary can enforce his right to records
by suspending an application for failure to make records available.
148
The Attorney General has the power to subpoena records under the Com-
143. 42 U.S.C. § 405(d) (1976).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii (1976) (extending the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 405(d) to the Medicare
program).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 3525 (1976). Other agency Inspectors General have similar subpoena author-
ity, but it is less likely that agencies other than the Department of Health and Human Services
would need medical records. See 5 U.S.C. app. I § 6(a) (Supp. V 1981).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 3523(a)(2) (1976).
147. 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (1976). The law requires that rules and regulations must "have due
regard for the professional ethics of the medical profession and the interests of patients." The
regulation do provide that information that would identify patients is not available for public
disclosure. The regulations are silent on possible sharing of identifiable data with other agencies
or with other components of the Department of Health and Human Services. See 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.14(e)(2)(i)(a) (1982).
148. 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1976).
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prehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970149 and to issue
administrative inspection warrants. 150 Similar authority with respect to work-
places and employment records, including medical records, is granted to the
Secretary of Labor under the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970,151
and to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, as an element of the
public health research features of the Act.152 The general subpoena authority
of the Internal Revenue Service can be used to obtain health records of physi-
cians and hospitals targeted for tax investigations.1
53
Disclosure of medical records can also be compelled by contract. For
example, federal law requires that Medicare contracts with health mainte-
nance organizations (HMOs) provide the Secretary of Health and Human
Services with a right of access to all pertinent HMO records.154 Federal Medi-
caid law requires that states with Medicaid programs obtain an agreement
from all providers of services that they will furnish the state or the Secretary
any requested information. 155 Also, the 1978 Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud
and Abuse Amendments encouraged states to establish Medicaid fraud control
units by providing significant federal funding, 156 and this has led to the pas-
sage of state laws granting these units subpoena and warrant authority.' 57
The breadth of the compulsory process powers that have been granted to
government agencies is illustrated by one of these state Medicaid fraud control
laws. In 1978 the State of Hawaii accepted the invitation in the Medicare-
Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments and established a Medicaid
Fraud Unit to investigate and prosecute Medicaid fraud.158 A companion law
authorized the issuance of administrative warrants to inspect, copy, and main-
tain records required to be kept by providers of health care services.1 59 For
purposes of such a warrant, probable cause was legislatively determined to
exist "upon showing a valid public interest in the effective enforcement" of the
149. 21 U.S.C. § 876 (1976).
150. 21 U.S.C. § 880 (1976). See United States v. Montrom, 345 F. Supp 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
aft'd, 480 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1973) (upholding inspection warrant of Bureau of Narcotics and Dan-
gerous Drugs for records and stocks of osteopath).
151. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a), (b) (1976).
152. 29 U.S.C. §§ 669(b), 671 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
153. 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1976). See United States v. Providence Hosp., 507 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.
Mich. 1981) (upholding IRS subpoena for patient-identifiable hospital records notwithstanding
medicare regulation governing confidentiality of medical records); Gretsky v. Basso, 136 F. Supp.
640 (D. Mass. 1955) (upholding IRS subpoena for patient-identifiable hospital records).
154. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 114, 96 Stat. 349
(1982) (amending § 1876 of the Social Security Act, to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395m(i)(3)(A)(ii)).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(27) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
156. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b(a)(6), 1396b(q) (Supp. V 1983). State Medicaid plans are required to
"provide safeguards which restrict the use or disclosure of information concerning applicants and
recipients to purposes directly connected with the administration of the plan." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(7) (1976).
157. See, eg., FLA. STAT. § 409.2664 (Supp. 1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §§ 1401-1411 (Put-
don Supp. 1983-84); VA. Coon § 32.1-310 to -321 (Supp. 1983).
158. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 28-91 (Supp. 1982).
159. Id. at § 346-42.
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Medicaid fraud law.' 60
In 1978 this law was relied upon to obtain a warrant authorizing the
seizure of a psychologist's records of Medicaid beneficiaries, including thera-
peutic notes, patient history forms, medical records and reports, and diagno-
ses.16' The warrant was obtained without a showing of "any particularized
need" to inspect the records, and without asking for voluntary production of
the records.'
62
The psychologist, together with the Hawaii Psychiatric Society, brought
suit in federal district court to enjoin enforcement of the administrative war-
rant authority. Among other things, the judge found that the law's probable
cause standard did not satisfy fourth amendment requirements and that there
was substantial probability that it violated the right to privacy.163 The judge
issued a preliminary injunction.
What is of particular significance here is not the ruling of the court or
even the willingness of the psychologist and others to challenge the statute, but
the statutory authority itself and the way that it was used. Upon a minimal
showing, a state agency was authorized by the legislature to seize medical
records without "even a suspicion" of fraud.164 The agency given the author-
ity proceeded to seize sensitive records of mental health treatment even though
the same information could have been obtained by other means. One can ex-
pect that government fraud investigators may use their powers of compulsory
process increasingly in the future.' 65 Whether other physicians or patients will
be willing or able to resist compulsory process, as was done in Hawaii, remains
to be seen.
2. United States v. Miller and the Right to Privacy
In considering the use of compulsory process to obtain personal records
maintained by third party record keepers, the Supreme Court's 1976 decision
in United States v. Miller' 66 is particularly relevant. In Miller a United States
Attorney subpoenaed a bank for the financial records of one of its customers,
who was a suspect in a criminal investigation. The subpoena was challenged
by the customer at trial, but the challenge was ultimately denied by the
Supreme Court. After finding that the bank records were not owned by the
customer and were not in his possession, the Court held that the customer did
not have any interest in the records and was not entitled to notice of the sub-
160. Id. at § 346-42(a)(1).
161. Hawaii Psychiatric Soe'y v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1034 (D. Hawaii 1979).
162. Id. at 1034-35.
163. Id. at 1046.
164. Id. at 1041.
165. Cf. Advocates for Children of New York, Inc. v. Blum, 529 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y.1982)
(Nonprofit and charitable agencies under contract with City of New York to provide preventive
services to children and families obtained a preliminary injunction prohibiting city and state offi-
cials from compelling the agencies to turn over uniform case records of clients, including intimate
personal and family information collected in confidence with some reasonable expectation of
privacy.).
166. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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poena or an opportunity to challenge it in court. In other words, the law does
not recognize that a bank customer has any interest protectable from the gov-
ernment in the records of his bank account. The Court reached this result
notwithstanding the personal nature of checking account information and the
customer's expectation that documents transmitted to the bank would remain
private.
167
Miller is a seminal case on the privacy of third party records. The Privacy
Protection Study Commission described the case as "starkly underscor[ing] an
individual's present defenselessness with respect to records maintained about
him."'168 Much of the work of that Commission, including its recommenda-
tions on the privacy of medical records, reflects its view that Miller should be
overturned by statute and that an individual must be given a legally enforcea-
ble interest in records about himself maintained by third parties. 169
Does the holding in Miller apply to medical records in a physician's pos-
session? Does an individual have a protectable legal interest in those medical
records? These questions can be debated at great length, but the short answer
is that it is uncertain. These issues have not been addressed authoritatively by
the Supreme Court or by lower courts. There are sufficient similarities between
bank records and medical records, however, to make the possibility of a com-
parable result real.17
0
The general significance of Miller for a third party record keeper is that if
the subject of a record has no legal, protectable interest in those records, the
record keeper must take steps to protect the interest of the subject of the
records or those interests will go unprotected. As a practical matter, in the
absence of a statute or a definitive court decision,' 7 ' the Miller decision is
167. Id. at 447 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529
P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974)).
168. PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
169. PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 19-21.
170. Federal legislation has diminished the likelihood that Miller will be applied again to
bank records. The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3401-3422 (Supp. V 1981),
generally provides that a federal agency seeking bank records, either by compulsory process or by
request, must notify the customer. The customer may fight the agency by going to court to protect
his privacy interests. The Act illustrates how an individual can be permitted to protect his own
interests in records maintained by third parties.
The Act should not be considered as a model for the protection of an individual's interest in
records maintained by third parties. In fact, the law falls considerably short of the recommenda-
tions made by the Privacy Protection Study Commission. See PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 1, at 345-91. The Act has been criticized, inter alia, for its numerous exemptions, and
for its formal request procedure (12 U.S.C. § 3408 (Supp. V 1981)) which permits all federal agen-
cies to seek voluntary disclosure of customer records from banks, and for customer challenge
procedures that place "a significant, and possibly unfair, burden on the customer." Trubow &
Hudson, The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978: New Protection From Federal Intrusion, 12 J.
MAR. J. PRAc. & PRoc. 487, 499 (1979). See also Note, The Right to Financial PrivacyAct of 1978,
28 DE PAUL L. REv. 1059 (1979).
171. A few state supreme courts have rejected Miller and reached different results based on
state constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. See, e.g., Charnes v.
DiGiacomo, 200 Colo. 94, 612 P.2d 1117 (1980); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 403 A.2d
1283 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980). Most states that have considered the issue, how-
ever, have followed Miller. See Note, A Right to Privacy in Bank Records The Colorado Supreme
Court Rejects United States v. Miller, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 529, 533-34 n.24 (1981).
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effectively being applied when medical records are subpoenaed. Government
agencies with powers of compulsory process and courts are not required to
notify patients. Whether a patient has standing to contest a subpoena is uncer-
tain. In the absence of timely notice, however, a patient is not in a position to
assert and defend his own privacy interest in his medical records. Since those
who seek medical records by subpoena take no steps to protect the patient's
privacy interest or to notify the patient of the subpoena, the patient's interest
will go unprotected unless the physician takes action.
3. Litigation
Recent litigation over demands by the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH) for access to medical records maintained by em-
ployers illustrates some of the options confronting physicians who are sub-
poened. t72 In a typical case, NIOSH issues a subpoena for occupational
medical records in connection with a health hazard investigation conducted
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,173 the company resists
the subpoena in whole or in part, and the agency goes to court against the
company to enforce its subpoena.
An initial issue in the NIOSH cases is whether the company has legal
standing to defend the right of privacy of its employees. Although the rela-
tionship between the employer and employee may not be as intimate as the
relationship between physician and patient, courts have found that the com-
pany has sufficient interest to assert the privacy claim. One court noted: "As a
practical matter, the absence of any notice to the employees of the subpoena
means that no person other than Westinghouse would be likely to raise the
privacy claim. Indeed, this claim may be effectively lost if we do not hear it
now."' 74 It is probable that, if a physician attempted to raise privacy on be-
half of his patients he would be found to have standing.
A second issue in the NIOSH cases is whether the employee/patient
should be notified of the subpoena. Companies and courts have taken differ-
ent approaches. In one case, General Motors notified 704 workers, seeking
their consent for the disclosure.' 75 Almost 500 of these workers did not con-
sent to the release of their records.' 76 In another case, although Westinghouse
did not initially notify its employees, notice was later required by the court in
172. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Director of Nat'l Inst. for Occupational Health &
Safety, 636 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 877 (1981); United States v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Lasco Indus., 531 F. Supp. 256
(N.D. Tex. 1981); United States v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1027 (E.D. Wis. 1980); E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Finklea, 442 F. Supp. 821 (S.D. W. Va. 1977).
173. 29 U.S.C. §§ 669(b), 671 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
174. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 574 (6th Cir. 1980); accord
United States v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1027, 1029 (E.D. Wis. 1980); United States v.
Lasco Indus., 531 F. Supp. 256, 263 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
175. General Motors Corp. v. Director of Nat'l Inst. for Occupational Health & Safety, 636
F.2d 163, 164 (6th Cir. 1980), cerl. denied, 454 U.S. 877 (1981).
176. I1d
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order to permit employees to raise personal claims of privacy.' 77
A third issue in the NIOSH cases involves restrictions on maintenance
and reuse of the medical records by the issuer of the subpoena. Protection of
data was an issue in both General Motors and Westinghouse, and both courts
reviewed the security arrangements. 178 Since NIOSH regulations generally
prohibited redisclosure, that was not an issue, although it might be in a differ-
ent case.1
79
What are the obligations of a physician who receives a summons, sub-
poena, or search warrant? If the physician neither notifies his patients nor
resists the process, no privacy claim will be raised and it may be lost entirely.
If the physician resists turning over the records, a complex and expensive law-
suit may result. It may not be coincidental that reported cases involving resist-
ance of subpoenas frequently involve large corporations that are capable of
financing the litigation costs.
An alternative for the physician is to notify his patients that the records
are being sought. This too involves an expense to physicians, although it
would likely be considerably less than the cost of litigation. Notifying patients
could have significant detrimental consequences for the relationship between
physician and his patients. For example, if patients are notified that their
records have been subpoenaed in a fraud investigation of the physician, the
patients might be confused by the fact of the investigation. Some patients
might automatically assume that the physician was guilty of a crime. Failure
to provide an explanation would probably result in some patients believing
that they were the targets of the investigation.180
The physician who receives a subpoena, summons, or search warrant for
medical records has no simple, convenient, or inexpensive way to respond to
the process and protect his patient's privacy interest at the same time. Each
alternative has distinct financial, medical, or other disadvantages. Existing le-
gal and ethical principles provide no guidance to physicians.
IV. CONCLUSION
Existing legal and ethical principles that guide physicians with respect to
their obligations to protect the confidentiality of medical records are generally
177. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 581-82 (6th Cir. 1980); accord
United States v. Lasco Indus., 531 F. Supp. 256, 265-66 (N.D. Tex. 1981). But see United States v.
Allis-Chalmers Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1027 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (notice to employees not provided or
required).
178. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 579-80 (6th Cir. 1980); General
Motors Corp. v. Director of Nat'l Inst. for Occupational Health & Safety, 636 F.2d 163, 166 (6th
Cir. 1980).
179. Legislation considered during the 96th Congress included specific restrictions on redis-
closure of patient information tailored to each different type of disclosure permitted. See HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 1; Senate Medical Privacy Hearings, supra note 13, at 455.
180. Section 133 of H.R. 5935, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) provided that notice to the patient
was not required in circumstances when the disclosure was for research, public health, audit, or
selected other purposes for which the bill would have permitted disclosure without the consent of
the patient. Notice was required when the patient was likely to be the target of an investigation.
See HousE REPORT, supra note I, at 70.
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out of date and are not comprehensive. Physicians faced with requests or de-
mands for patient information will find little in law or ethics to define their
responsibilities with any precision. Yet the physician frequently is the only
one who is in a position to take action to protect the confidentiality of his
records and the privacy of his patients.
This problem has always existed, but was not as serious in the past be-
cause medical records were only occasionally used outside the medical treat-
ment process. Confidentiality increasingly is taking second place to a growing
list of competing interests, however, and the expanded use of medical records
for nontreatment purposes is exacerbating the shortcomings in existing confi-
dentiality principles.
There are several major consequences of these developments. First, as
demand for medical records increases, the physician is being called upon to
play a more central role in the protection of confidentiality. But the role that a
physician should play is undefined because the physician's responsibilities are
unclear. The result may be increased litigation over medical confidentiality
issues and the obligations of physicians.
Second, the widespread dissemination and use of medical records ulti-
mately may give rise to the general belief that information provided "in confi-
dence" to a physician is no longer confidential. 181 If this occurs, the
consequences for the practice of medicine are uncertain. If confidentiality is
important to the practice of medicine, it may become necessary to require phy-
sicians to protect patient confidentiality or to permit patients to protect their
own interests in confidentiality.
Third, because of the magnitude and complexity of privacy issues today,
the courts cannot be expected to develop appropriate solutions in a timely
fashion. Some issues, such as disclosure of medical records to intelligence
agencies or to the Secret Service, are not likey to arise in litigation. When an
issue such as the right of public health officials to have access to medical
records arises, it is likely to be in the midst of a public health emergency when
the need for a fast resolution may prevent a carefully considered decision.
Other balances, such as weighing the rights of patients against the interest of
the government in maintaining proper fiscal controls on health programs, re-
quire factual, fiscal, and policy determinations most suited for resolution by
legislatures.
A further shortcoming of judicial decisionmaking on medical privacy
questions is the likelihood that any rules promulgated by the courts will fail to
satisfy all of the criteria for confidentiality guidance discussed above.'
82
While the policy judgments made by the courts may well be appropriate, and
181. Disclosures made during treatment also can give rise to the belief that patient records are
not confidential. A physician who told his patient that at least seventy-five health professionals
had access to the patient's medical record during a hospital stay received this reaction from his
distressed patient: "I always believed that medical confidentiality was part of a doctor's code of
ethics. Perhaps you should tell me just what you people mean by 'confidentiality!" Siegler, Cofi-
dentiality in Medicine-A Decrepit Concept, 307 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 1518, 1519 (1982).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 42 & 43.
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while it is not inconceivable that a judicial decision could be understood by
the medical community, the piecemeal nature of litigation makes it unlikely
that any rules will meet the foregoing standards for comprehensiveness. It
could take decades before a complete set of rules evolved from judicial deci-
sions. Therefore, the only practical way to develop suitable guidance defining
the responsibilities of physicians, the right of patients, and the proper protec-
tion for medical information is through legislation.
